EDITED VERSION OF THE SPEECH BY SINGAPORE'S PRIME MINISTER, MR.LEE KUAN YEW, TO STUDENTS AT VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND, ON 11TH MARCH,1965 -- BROADCAST BY RADIO MALAYSIA (SINGAPURA) ON 20TH MARCH, 1965 AT 10.00 P.M.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

This evening I would like to discuss with you some of the broader sweeps of the events which have taken place in this century, and the likely tendencies that these events will have in the second half of the century, and finally how SOUTHEAST ASIA and Malaysia fit into this broader whole.

For the last three, nearly four, centuries European nations had dominated the world scene. Britain came out, created her Empire, not only amongst the less-developed communities, but ... as they found in New Zealand or Australia or Africa, but more so amongst highly-developed civilisation like India -- extended her influence over the middle-East and over China. The French, the Dutch, the Portuguese, shared in the same pursuits. European superiority in the sciences, her skill in armoury, in the modern techniques of war, ensured the supremacy of a relatively small proportion of mankind over the vast majority of the known world. The Germans came in later, the Italians, to share in the spoils.

All that is past history. The 20th century saw the dissolution of these empires. What the end of the 20th century will see we can only hazard a guess. But I think it is probably sufficiently of interest to us to try and chart insofar as we accurately can the likely course of events in the next decade.

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Today, we face a world in which the ancient civilizations, the Chinese, the Indian, the Arabic, have been aroused and are wanting to re-assert themselves on the world scene. Accompanying them are a vast majority of smaller groups of people, broadly grouped together as the Afro-Asian nations. India is in it, the Arabs as represented by the UAR. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria - so are the Chinese, and the Indians. But one thing still remains as it was -- for how long I do not know -- the supremacy of the European peoples in scientific techniques of conducting war; and, more important, in the industrial capacity to sustain modern warfare.

So, it is unlikely, in my view whatever one may believe of the wickedness of the Communities and the Chinese Communists, that they would seek war. They know that under present circumstances it is not in their interests to seek war. But I think they also know that, given time in which to consolidate their gains, given time in which to consummate their system, perhaps in another 20, 30 or more years, the odds will not be that unequal and then brinkmanship from their point of view need not be a one-sided thing.

What is the meaning of all this? The last twenty years, since 1945, has seen the early idealism of the Rule of Law, International Morality, a counting of heads in the United Nations, try to bring about majority rule of some sort in relations between nations -- provided of course that in the things that really matter to the big powers, the veto can be exercised.

We are now, perhaps, not just in the watershed of the history of a region, but perhaps in the watershed of the history of man. In the early `30's, we saw the beginnings of events which ultimately led to the Second World War. I do not believe there had been any other previous occasion when the United Nations was more in doubt than it is today. There is no danger of a rival organisation as yet being set up to create equal ground, says the Chinese communist leaders, the footing.

But the very fact that it is in recess, unable to resolve its own internal conflicts, let alone resolve the contradictions which exist between members of the United Nations and those outside it, is something which must sober the most optimistic of us.

From an Asian viewpoint, I see this as a process, as a period in which the European world begins to learn, to readjust its attitudes with the non- European world. First, that the old civilisations -- China, India, the Arab world---and ultimately, how these old civilisations, non-European civilizations -- together with the Europeans decide to deal with the lesser groups of human societies scattered throughout the rest of the world.

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You know, for 20 years we have played -- of there has been either a pretence at, if one was cynical; but a genuine attempt, if one was sincere -- at bringing morality and civilised standards into international relations without the over-riding force and sanction of ultimate authority. Deference has always been paid to majority opinion, the world view, the Afro-Asian view, the Emergent Nations, the under-developed nations. There are many of them. And playing within that limited cosmos, short of large-scale war, it

was useful for the major contenders, who were world powers, to be able to present this facade -- if one were cynical -- or the solid mass support of the righteous indignation of right-thinking people -- if one were sincere.

But, nevertheless, because neither of two contending military powers saw it in their interests to put their might to the test, for the minor skirmishes it was in their interest to try and line up the votes in the United Nations.

I now say we are at the watershed of history because, I think, we are nearing the time when it is possible that the big powers will again begin to think in terms of not just counting heads, but of real ultimate capacity of survive conflict.

I read with great interest an interview in a London newspaper between an American Journalist and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. And the light-hearted way in which he tossed aside this question of admission to the United Nations and the weight of world opinion which meant the counting of votes of nations which, according to him, would have amounted to no more than mere provincial districts of China. And, in a gentle in somewhat startling way, these remarks reveal the drift towards a real politics.

The problem is no longer clothed in terms of moral righteousness, of helping the developing nations to develop; but more fundamental and vital, of ensuring the big-power interests and the balance between the big powers are not suddenly upset.

As I have said earlier, the second half of the 20th century will witness first, in my view, the reassertion of the ancient civilizations. And next, after that, assuming that the world still has not destroyed itself, how they collectively view the less sophisticated civilisations that exist.

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I was at a Maori celebration yesterday evening, and my heart went out to them as I saw a small group trying under very adverse circumstances to preserve vestiges of their past. Songs, dances, the attitudes, philosophies, valid in an age gone by. Whether these same physical figures, this same uninhibited emotional open-mindedness, would ensure their advance under new conditions they face in which they are a minority, is another matter. But I have no doubts whatsoever that in the ancient civilizations -- Chinese, the Indians, the Arabic -- people not only with the cultural techniques with which to galvanize and mobilise human nature, but with a calculated sense of greatness not only of their past bur in their renaissance -- in them, is the first challenge to European domination and supremacy.

And so we went through this phase from 1945to 1962, if you like, till the Chinese first came into conflict with the Indians and crossed the Himalayas; when the non-European world was completely united in wanting to assert themselves against the Europeans.

Nehru sought communion with Mao, with Chou En-lai, however divergent their creeds and political beliefs. That he failed was a sad commentary not on the solidarity, or lack of solidarity of the Asian peoples, but on the inevitability of conflicts, once international relations between groups of human beings constituted together as nations, are based ultimately on power. And 1962, to my mind, marks the first turning- point.

Up till then, it was the non-Europeans versus the Europeans. It does not matter how divergent the Africans were from the Indians in Africa. They were solidly together because both were exploited in either British colonies or French colonies. It didn't matter how divergent the Chinese and the Malays and the Indians were in Malaysia, or the Dayaks, and the Dusuns and the Ibans, and the Muruts and so on: it was the solidarity of peoples who were lower down in the world order. They wanted to re-assert themselves.

The fact that the capacity for re-assertion varied amongst these different groups was a matter which was glossed over in the initial stages. Now, perforce, it has become more prominent. And, because it has, so schisms have developed on the broad anti-European front. And the events of the next, second half of this century, depends upon whether the Europeans, who today between themselves, the North Americans, the Europeans and British powers, and the white Russians, intend to act collectively as one group of human beings as against the rest, or whether their ideological and other compelling interests will blur and confuse and make more complex the lines of conflict.

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I do not know what would have happened if Mr. Khrushchev had carried on. That is so much speculation. But we do know that Mr. Khrushchev has been removed, that however determined his successors are to disengage themselves from minor wars in Southeast Asia just in case it would lead to major war in which their own interests may be sacrificed or put in jeopardy, they are nevertheless now unable to detach themselves altogether from this conflict. For the price they may have to pay is that Chinese communist leaders played as patiently, as skillfully and as subtly as they have done, the price the Russians have to pay is the surrender of world communist leadership to the Chinese communists.

And that bring us to the problem of Southeast Asia. It is a confused and complicated situation in which the various parts, some of them old ancient civilisations like Cambodia, or even the Vietnamese, or the Thais, or new ones like Malaysia, are unable as yet to identify what their collective group interests are. And how to gather strength by getting together with those who share if not common interests, at least common fear. And in this very confused milieu, you have the fascinating spectacle of the Indonesians, determined that they shall become a great power… saddling the cross-roads between the Northern and the Southern hemispheres, between Asia and Australasia, between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific destined in the President's own words in 1945: God had ordained, said he, all published, in minutes of their meetings before their proclamation of their independence, "God had ordained"-- his God had ordained -- "that this group of islands should be one great nation". And he, believing that, is now actively working if not in consort at least in collaboration, if not in collaboration at least with the assistance and connivance of the Chinese communist government.

That an American-biased government in the Philippines in wishing to re-assert its image or try and create a new image of being an anti-colonialist and a nationalist force and not an American puppet regime, finds itself in conflict over territorial claims on Malaysia, linked up with Indonesia and indirectly with Communist China. That the Pakistanis who are anti-communist and members of CENTO AND SEATO are now more closely allied and publicly identified with the Chinese government than the Indians who set forth to blaze the path of national co-operation, non-alignment, Afro-Asian solidarity. What does this all add up to mean?

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I suggest that first we put power in its proper perspective. True, self-determination is important. Then, how 500,000 Papuans in West New Guinea decide to be in their collective interests is really a matter of great principle. But great principles do not move big powers to take actions which militate against their own interests. And so, the Papuans willy-nilly, with American assistance, went to Indonesia.

It is true it is very important what the people in Sabah think of their future. And what they think of the future I am quite sure is completely unrelated with the niceties of expression of documents signed by the Sultan of Sulu and the Sultan of Brunei in the last century. But it is solemnly asserted today that the future of these territories should be decided upon the interpretation of the World Court on the turn of phrase whether it was "lease" or it was "given in perpetuity". But is that really what is the issue in

Southeast Asia? Or is it the conflict of bigger interests in which the smaller pawns are moved?

And, speaking as one who comes from a country which is destined for a very long while to be a very small digit in Southeast Asia however fast and hard we multiply, I am resigned to accept the arbiter of the power-interests. If in fact Malaysia, if in fact Singapore, and its important geographic position, is of no value to the West, or if in fact the Western presence is not desired by the West in Southeast Asia, then nobody will be interested really to expend all this money, to expend all this effort, divert their resources, in defence of freedom.

But it so happens that these things do matter, that whether we perish or we survive does affect the course of events for big powers. And our capacity to survive is related to our capacity to discern where big power interests must collide, and how in this conflict of power- interests we are to find a coincidence of interests for ourselves.

If today I believe that a Western presence in southeast Asia is inimitable to the advancement of 11-million people in Malaysia, then we would advance a different set of reasons why in fact all this is wrong, why in fact if the British withdrew we'd probably find ourselves in complete agreement with Indonesia because the British withdrew and all the Australians and New Zealanders go back to Australia and New Zealand, everything would be well. But we know that everything will not be well. Worse, we know that we shall be in very grave peril. Therefore, all the reasons are advanced why in the interests of self-determination, respect for international law, the upholding of international morality, it is necessary that force shall not pay -- which means, of course, that in order to meet superior force on the side of the Indonesians, we have the right of invoking the aid all those who are prepared to come in our defence, whatever their motivations.

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And so I think with that understood, speaking candidly to the intellectual elite of Wellington and of New Zealand, we then examine how our common efforts can be safeguarded in this very complex situation.

And the first question having been asked, my answer is that whatever the ultimate permutation and combinations of power blocks may be in Asia, the happiness of the 11-million people depends upon our capacity to be left to advance on our own with such help as we can muster from outside and from with our own country, and to be left in peace.

Who, therefore, would not leave us in peace? And if it were the British, and the Australians or the New Zealanders, well then we would be "again" them. But they have so many other preoccupations that we are quite convinced they would leave us in peace. And so you see, the British Naval Bases and Airfields and Ordinance Depots in Singapore no longer pose the same problems, no longer invokes or evokes the same emotional antagonism.

It is like, for the anti-colonialist in Southeast Asia sometimes survival depends upon being able in negotiate U-turn, a very sharp U-turn and very high-speed; and so in 1959 for instance in Singapore, in order to achieve our first objective, namely our right to determine our own future, these bases of authority -- European authority or British authority, Western alliance depended upon the efficacy of its use of the bases in Singapore -- they were anathema. And indeed, they were to the mass of the people. For their unhappiness, their poverty, malnutrition, lack of schools, lack of clothing, hook-worms, tape-worms, were all attributed to the presence of these European powers and to the callous, ambitious way in which they exploited the people.

That was a tide in history, and I would say if ultimately the pendulum does not swing to the other end against the European powers, they should be grateful for the consummate skill and great courage which the British governments in succession, both Conservative and Labour, had in their anticipatory sense of history. They did not fight the inevitable. They went with it. And so, they made it possible, I hope it had been possible, for us to negotiate, for people like me in Malaysia, to negotiate this U-turn at high speed without grave damage to ourselves.

You see, nations, just like human beings, must respond in defence of their interests. And the tragedy of Southeast Asia is that quite a number of them have not been able to discern, to identify and to define what was, first, in their own national interests; secondly, how to broaden the base on which those national interests of theirs could withstand assault. And it is really a fascinating theory in these last few decades since the war whether the Burmese and the Indians and the Pakistanis, having all that solidarity, fighting against the British Raj -- and the Ceylonese -- for them when they emerged, act less in consort than any four groups of heterogeneous powers in Europe or in Latin America, faced with similar perils, would have reacted.

So, too, with the Indonesians -- a complete incapacity to really identify what is in the long term interests of their own 103 or 104 or 105 million peoples, which grows up every time the President makes a speech, a pronouncement, it goes up by one million.

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But the spectacle that we are witnessing is something quite unparalleled in the history of nations, because in the case of quite a number of them -- India, Pakistan, or even the Ceylonese or the Burmese -- they are relatively ancient civilizations. These are not new creations. I mean, they are very different from the -- say -- African nations south of the Sahara, without that same accumulation of human experience of how human beings react, tribe versus tribe, nation versus nation, the permutations and combinations which inevitably take new patterns like the turn a of a kaleidoscope with every new change in common interests. And in this situation, therefore, the big powers find considerable room for manoeuvre.

You know, it is believed, or so the popular political weekend commentaries make people to believe, that the Indians were a very unprincipled lot originally who made use of the West and made use of the East; got aid from America and from Britain, one steel mill from the United States matched by one steel mill from the Russians. Latest automatics from the West matched by latest jets from Russia. But really, you know, if they had been more cynical, right from the very start, and played this game of power politics in their interests, perhaps they would have done better for themselves, most certainly, and perhaps Southeast Asia as a whole would be a much healthier place today, for they would have learned to act in consort with each other.

You know, for the Pakistanis and for the Indians to be in acute conflict over some luscious highlands in Kashmir, and want the anti-communists to be closely aligned with the communists in order to score or put the non-communists at a disadvantage, is something which nobody would have predicted or believed, even five, six years ago. And these things have happened in my view because of the idealism with which they could their international relations. And so it is that we in Malaysia are unable to present a better front to the world; that the only people who have openly come to our support are white nations----Britain, Australia, New Zealand. When the Indians must know and so must the Thais and so must the Burmese, and so indeed must the Filipinos, that if we go, then the situation is perilous for them indeed.

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But you see the incapacity of people, same rational human beings, to sit back and identify their common interests, and having identified it to be able to adjust their position and postures. How much better if today in Malaysia we had not only firm guarantees of our survival from the Government in Wellington, but also more solemn and weightier words from New Delhi, to be echoed by Rangoon, or Rawalpindi or

Colombo. Or any one of these countries. And that is the dilemma that the smaller powers in Asia are faced with.

I do not know exactly how the Africans will react in such a situation. I have reasons to believe that perhaps they may not have to face such acute conflicts between the public posture than their real interests for quite some time. But I think it was not without significance that when three governments were threatened in East Africa, the inhibitions at being classified or being classified or being associated with a "neo-colonialist" or European colonial powers was brushed aside in the urge for survival, and British troops were able because the African governments made a political decision to help them avoid some of the confusion and miseries of governments before their authority has been finally established, not just by force, but by acceptance of the populace at large.

I would like to round up this broad review of the events of the last two decades by anticipating what I think may happen in the next. What would 1975 look like for Southeast Asia, and for Australasia? Is it possible to hold the line, as the Americans put it, the 17th parallel in Vietnam, a more or less neutral Laos getting less and less neutral, a Cambodia which is able to still give sentiments expression which leave the final expression if not of firm attachment to any one particular side, at least a firm belief in the survival of a separate Cambodian state. I think the answer to that first depends upon whether the Chinese are able to get the Russians committed irrevocably, either as leaders of the revolutionary forces in which case she is committed to lead them, if necessary in war; or committed to the abandonment of the leadership of the revolutionary forces in which case China emerges as the leader of all the under-dog nations. If it is the first, that in fact the Russians do feel obliged to come out as the leader of the revolutionary forces of the world, not to be out-done either in sentiments or in expressions of revolutionary fervour by the Chinese leaders, then I say the future is hazardous indeed.

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In that situation, I do not see how it is possible for small-scale wars to be prevented from developing into large- scale wars and into ultimate confrontation of nuclear powers. That beings so , I would like to believe that the Russians would not allow themselves to be manoeuvred into that position where they have to come out in open support, active military support, of world revolutions wherever revolutionary fervour may choose to manifest itself, whether it is South Vietnam, Cuba, Burundi, Congo , or elsewhere in the world.

The other alternative where the Russians abdicate their position, I think, is one which would buy peace in SOUTHEAST ASIA for at least one decade, maybe two, depending upon when a nuclear stalemate is established between the Americans and China. When a nuclear stalemate is established, and one can do the other of not equally grievous harm, but at least similarly grievous harm, then the battle moves into a new dimension, because then you will slog it out with foot-soldiers on the Asian mainland.

So all this, put against this broader canvas, is really so many red herrings. May I add when I say this that we should always remember that when the Chinese leaders talk of revolution, they mean revolution, and not conquests. And this is where the real threat lies. Not Chinese conquests, as posed in popular fiction as if one were to draw up a comic strip for yellow human beings running all around Asia -- that is too simple. If in fact Communism means the Chinese solider marching across national boundaries, liberating parts of SOUTHEAST ASIA and installing their puppets, their little communist proxies in these states, then communist is equated in Asian minds to Chinese imperialism, and therefore you will get a real rally of all the forces who are against Chinese imperialism and conquest. And therefore the solution would be easier. I say the peril that we face is our incapacity as non-communist states to be able to withstand the ideological blandishments which communist example spreads, holds up, and spreads out before the rest of Asia; to the mass base, to the Asian masses, they say "This is the way to greatness. Never mind the rights of man and the declaration of human rights". They mean nothing if you are hungry, if you're ill-fed, if you're ill-clothed.

This is the way to build a great nation. Disciplined, dedicated leadership, ideological purity, the sacrifice is forgotten in the moment of success. When the Hydrogen Bomb goes up into the sky, men's minds go through a similarly fashionable change -- forgotten are the acute hardships that preceded this momentous success, a price that if they had rational choice, they would never choose to take. And, accompanied with this, is their capacity to export ideas -- not soldiers, but ideas which in turn galvanise local revolutionary groups into activity on behalf of their side, the Communist world.

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How do we meet this? Can it be met? Well, if I did not believe it could, then I wouldn't be here. But at the same time, I would be misleading if I did not add that a very heavy price will have to be paid in order to hold our own. You see, the lesson of South Vietnam is one which will never be lost on any one of us. Eleven fearfully

expensive years were bought. Now it would appear all to no purpose, because as the line was held militarily as the North Vietnamese were kept out, political consolidation of non-communist groups, the consolidation of the social and economic systems that could generate prosperity and growth, never took place. Let us assume that it was in fact an operation in desperation, that in fact the objective was to but time not for South Vietnam, but for the rest of Southeast Asia. I say the next moral that we have to draw from this is that eleven expensive bitterly expensive years passed, and as South Vietnam is going through almost the rigours of death, you hear of the Government of Thailand wishing to hold elections in order to find broad, popular, democratic support for its Government after eleven years of authoritarian army rule.

It is their ideas taking root in fertile, revolutionary ground, in a situation where people have reached a point of desperation, when they prepared throw caution to the winds and man the barricades -- it may take some time before they are able to get sufficiently organised to overwhelm a well-armed and disciplined regime, but no regime, however disciplined, however well-armed, can survive if the majority of the people are prepared to acquiesce in violent revolution. There's no need for them to get active support. They need get only active support from their field framework of revolutionary cadres that dedicate the instruments of revolution, be it 2,000 in Singapore, 2 million in Indonesia. But if the mass of the people opt out and stay: "Well, it really can't be worse", then the fish begins to swim in water, because the mass have turned to it. And this is the problem which the Americans are facing in South Vietnam.

The mass of the people have opted out. By the time you get your own Buddhist priesthood talking in term of desperation, both sides withdraw, North Vietnamese and Americans, leave us in peace. A death-wish. They must die. I mean, they cannot survive as Buddhist priests in authority in Vietnam. But when they opt out in such massive proportions, and nobody is prepared to stand up and rally the people on behalf of authority, then the alternative is either open foreign military occupation, or calamitous defeat and withdrawal.

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I do not envy the Americans their position. But at the same time, I find it difficult altogether to be in sympathy with them, for as I said they bought eleven years an enormous price and they did not use those eleven years. I find it difficult to believe that there were not many Vietnamese in South Vietnam in 1954 who could not have been brought together to form a nucleus of rational, honest -- if not dedicated, at least rational and honest -- and effective opinion to give the way ahead to the South Vietnamese

peasants. In 1954 there were South Vietnamese professors in French Universities and I do not believe that the South Vietnamese lack the intellectual capacity to present this spearhead for nationalist aspirations. I sometimes believe that perhaps if there were more with them, things would never have got to this sorry pass.

You see, the tragedy of Southeast Asia is not only the tragedy of its lack of mature appreciation of Southeast Asia's own national interests, but lack of wisdom and mature policies from those who had the physical wherewithal that gave them the right to world leadership. The only reason why Malaysia emerged from very near chaos, from the early days of the 1950's to the peace and tranquility and progress of the 1960's before confrontation was because, first, the British had the wisdom to recognise what was irresistible, and therefore not to resist it; and secondly, having decided that freedom movements were irresistible, to try insofar as they can to make sure if they cannot get anti-Communist groups to emerge as the dominant force, in a territory they have to abandon, at least let the leadership be non-Communist.

You see, one of my great lacks as an anti-colonial revolutionary is that I have never been put in jail. And that is tribute to the consummate skill with which a colonial regime opted out. They could not fight the Communists. They knew it. Because they were not only fighting the Communists, they were taking the lot -- the people versus the regime. If they opted out too quickly and the people took over, people as people were defined in the 1940's, it means the Communist Party, because they were the people who had begun the organisation to ensure their supremacy. So tenaciously as they held on, first hoping that perhaps they could ride all this, next in case they could not ride then at least build up their apparatus which alternative leadership could take over and withstand Communist pressure.

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And so it was, you know, that if they had done what I think Ngo Dinh Diem did to his opponents in the early '50's, I would have been, and people like me would have been scrubbed out. Or, forced to go over to the other side. But they ensured that such things did not happen. They made sure that the people who looked like being able to put up a fight were quickly manoeuvred into a position where they had to fight. So, in 1959, they handed over authority including internal security, powers over the police, two regiments, in Singapore. Having done that, skillfully manoeuvred the Communists out into open conflict with us so that a stand had to be taken, and they opted out.

What is to follow depends very much upon whether we are able to seek a community of interests not only with Europeans and Australasian powers who are

prepared to support our independence but also without other Asian, African and other non-European interests. Little nations like us who are either finding or may find themselves in a similarly difficult position, where they have not got the capacity to withstand the pressures of a bigger and more rapacious neighbour. Presented with this broad front, not just of European interests, but of the interests of all small power groups seeking survival, I think Southeast Asia is likely to be stabilised.

This assumes, of course, that meanwhile the fringes are not corroded too quickly. I do not know what the answer in South Vietnam is, but I do know that if you are unable to convince the Thais that their freedom, their integrity, will be upheld and that they will not be abandoned, and if they anticipate history as they have shown a particular capacity for doing on many a past occasion, then time may run out too quickly for them.

So, first, to understand all this, one must be realistic and see this in the wider perspective of real world power conflicts: the non-European powers wanting to re-assert and resume their old positions of authority and respect in the comity of nations; the non-European powers discovering that even between themselves the older civilisations are not altogether at indent. The European powers themselves, uncertain whether their respective futures depend upon a solid front against the non-Europeans or a more diverse approach -- the Russians, ideologically the French, the European line, the Americans -- seeking clear-out solutions where perhaps clear-out solutions are not possible.

Against that background, we seek survival. And we share one thing in common with you; that so many of the bigger factors are beyond our dispensation-- what the Russians choose to do in Indo-China is something neither you nor I can influence directly, perhaps indirectly advice, attitudes, postures, hoping that the Americans, or the Chinese or the Russians will take note -- but directly, there is very little that we can do. But nevertheless, there are many other factors within our dispensation which it will be foolish for us not to exercise.

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Let us assume that South Vietnam does go. I mean, when we begin to think the unthinkable and speak the unthinkable, does it mean that we must perish? I refuse to concede that, and it is only on that basis, a tenacious holding-on to what we believe to be our little place in this world, that we will prevent a great deal of unhappiness and destruction upon ourselves, the small powers and perhaps upon humanity as a whole.

And so, you see, behind all this play of the small powers seeking shelter within the conflicts of big powers, behind the cynicism of the approach, there is a genuine and sincere identity of interests of groups of people in similarly placed circumstances. So it is that slowly I would want to convince people in Malaysia that whatever the past, the British are not rapacious colonialists now whatever their economic and other interests are in Malaysia, that the Australians and the New Zealanders however unaltruistic their motivations may be in coming to our defence nevertheless make a real and positive contribution to our survival. And when we get our own people understanding that, and a large mass of other similarly small people in Afro-Asia appreciating, accepting and sympathising with that attitude, then the ground can be more firmly held, and the flexibility of the military response can be such more subtle and much more immediate.

This is a continuing battle which I hope will not be fought in vain.

Thank you.

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