TEXT OF MR. LEE KUAN YEW'S SPEECH AT A RALLY

AT AMPANG VILLAGE, KUALA LUMPUR ON

12TH APRIL, 1964.

Proposal to end Confrontation betrays Socialist Front links

The latest 5-point proposal put forward by the Secretary-General of the Labour Party, Dr. Wee Lee Fong, reveals the tie-up between them and the Indonesians. Everyone of those 5 points either echos an Indonesian demand like a U.N. Referendum in Borneo, or is otherwise designed to assist them like the withdrawal of British troops. One of the 5 conditions for resolving this dispute is a demand to release all political detainees held without trial and "the normalisation of the democratic life". Does this not show that detainees and those who seek to use the democratic processes to undermine the state expect to get a benefit out of Indonesia's confrontation, otherwise why name this as one of the conditions for ending confrontation. What relevance is there between our political detainees and Indonesia's confrontation.

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Dr. Wee went on to say that the S.F. would call on the whole nation to fight against Indonesia if their proposal was accepted and Indonesia still continues confrontation. But having called for the withdrawal of all British and

Gurkha troops and the abolition of British bases, does Dr. Wee believe that the Socialist Front calling upon the whole nation can save us from Indonesia? In any case the Socialist Front are opposed to the call-up, so who is to do the fighting when Indonesia attacks again? On whose side is the Socialist Front?

The dilemma of the Socialist Front is that they had to take the international Communist line, fight Malaysia even though it is in the interests of our people. They are now completely dependent on the PKI to achieve any power. More and more their fate is irrevocably tied up with that of the PKI. The pity of it is that even the PKI were to win, we doubt whether Dr. Wee and his Chinese "comrades" in the Socialist Front would be able to share the spoils with the PKI.

Next 9 years different from last nine

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In 1955 the one big problem the Tunku inherited was a straight forward Emergency caused by an armed Communist revolt. To deal with it he had an honest and effective administration built up by the British to cope with the situation, with a great number of expatriate administrators and technical men. The problem was to do what the British colonial government could not do -- rally the mass base around this administration to ensure victory. The Tunku did this when he got Merdeka and the Emergency was won, not so much by military

effort as by the political transformation which independence and a popular mass following gave to the Government. Then with good rubber prices there has been economic development and good reserves.

This time we start off with an administration nearly depleted of all the experienced expatriate administrators. Their places have been taken by younger Malaysians. Whilst some of them are of better quality than the expatriates they have replaced, others have not got the same wealth of experience and training. The administrative machine to carry out the Government's policies is a little slower than it used to be in 1955. All expatriate help, for political reasons, will slowly have to go. The Commander-in-Chief is now a Malay. Let us hope that there will be an outstanding local officer who can emerge to take the place of the present Inspector-General. To displace the Inspector-General before we have such a man is to run a grave risk of lowering efficiency and effectiveness. And now with a temporarily less effective machine there are bigger problems -- not only Communist subversion in the towns but also Indonesian subversion in the rural areas, coupled with aggression on our borders and fifth columnists and saboteurs inside the country.

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In 1955 the Communists had no outside help. Now they have got the help not only of Indonesian subversionists but also Indonesian frogmen, saboteurs and

regular troops. And unlike good rubber prices of the last few years, the indications are that with prices between 60 and 70 cents, Malaysia will experience difficulties in balancing her budget because of increased development and defence expenditure.

Easier for PAP to stay out and snipe at Government

We had taken the reasonable line that we must help the Central Government to make a success of Malaysia. But some people are under the illusion that we want to do this for our own party advantage.

Let me put the alternatives. If we believed that things could carry on for another five years with the PAP joining the opposition and sniping at the Government, then the temptation to do this is very great indeed. For it is very much easier not to be responsible for some of the follies, misdeed and misdemeanours of some members of the present administration. Then having consolidated ourselves whilst the Central Government loses more ground over the next five years, we can make a bid for office in 1969 in conjunction with a group of young Malay intellectuals who are bound to emerge, if not in UMNO, then in some other party within the next few years.

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Perdition -- unless we pool resources and talent

But we know that to do this is to run a grave risk of bringing not just UMNO down, but the whole administrative and economic fabric of the country. For unless we can throw in everything that we have got, pool resources and talent, not just between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, but also bringing the best from Jesselton and Kuching, Malaysia will not be able to survive the grave tests before her. The situation will deteriorate to a point where it is unlikely that the country can be governed through the democratic system, and then it is doubtful whether elections will be held in 1969, or ever again. Then the drift towards the Burmese and South Vietnamese type of situation will begin.

I have recited some of the different problems that we will be facing. The machine at the Government's disposal to meet these problems is for the time being less effective than what it used to be. Somehow we must increase the horse-power in the machine and stop the drift to trouble when a sagging administration with diminishing resources have to meet an increasingly difficult situation being exploited by more intelligent Communists now assisted from outside.

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We have confined our contribution so far to urban development and how the urban situation can be resolved because we feel we can make an effective contribution in this sphere. We have left the rural development as the prerogative of UMNO in these elections. It is not that we do not consider the rural problems important. In fact, we have said before that the rural mass base is the sheet anchor of Malaysia's stability and security, and must be preserved. We are quite willing to help in working out more effective development programmes to make the rural base more secure against Indonesian and Communist subversion.

Reappraisal at the crossroads on 26th April

In two weeks time the Tunku and his colleagues will come face to face with what they already know in their hearts of hearts that adjustments are necessary for Malaysia to be governed harmoniously and effectively. The MCA has become too feeble. It is now too flimsy a facade and can make no contribution.

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We do not expect any immediate spectacular change, for that is not in the nature of the Tunku. But if the towns show decisively that they want a social revolution, it is also in the Tunku's nature to take heed of popular feelings and make adjustments accordingly.

We know that some MCA members in Malay rural strongholds will be returned and will remain in the next Government. But what is more important is that the content and policy should be changed to consciously bring about more equal opportunities for all. We are prepared to help in this not because it is to our advantage but because there is no choice. For us to stay out in the opposition, sniping at the Government and exposing their follies without helping to put things right would be to court disaster for the country. When disaster inevitably comes, we must bear part of the responsibility. If, on the other hand, we are prepared to help but are denied the opportunity, and disaster follows, the responsibility would not be ours.

12th April, 1964.

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