Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

1. Singapore is pleased to be hosting Exercise Deep Sabre. This is the 17th Proliferation Security Initiative (or PSI) exercise, and the first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia.

2. This maritime interdiction exercise is also one of the largest PSI exercises to date, with ten ships and six maritime patrol aircraft taking part. I am also glad to note the participation of so many of our PSI partners from around the world. Taking part in the wide range of activities in Exercise Deep Sabre over the next few days are armed forces, coast guards, customs and other agencies from 13 countries – Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. Your presence reflects the strong commitment of your countries to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Threat of WMD Proliferation

3. The threat of WMD proliferation is not new, but the nature of the threat today is different. This threat is today more immediate and more acute than it has ever been. This unfortunate reality is a result of two convergent trends. First, the rise of extremist terrorism has brought a new dimension to the WMD threat. We now have a network of terrorists who will use the most extreme violence and destruction to achieve their objectives. They will use all means to acquire WMD, and their actions so far leave little doubt that they will use the huge destructive power of WMD should they get their hands on them. Second, with globalisation and a highly inter-connected world, the channels through which WMD and related materials can be acquired and transferred have multiplied.

4. The threat of WMD proliferation has greatly increased with the emergence of global terrorism. The terrorist attacks that have taken place around the world since 9-11 are not isolated acts with local objectives, but strands of a single, global web of terror. These terrorists are engaged in the same ideological struggle, whether they strike London, Sharm-El Sheikh, New York, Riyadh, Madrid or Jakarta.

5. The terrorists aim for disruption on a dramatic scale, so the destructive power of WMD has a clear attraction. They will have no qualms about using what the civilised world regards as weapons of last resort. Documents and other material seized in Afghanistan revealed a trail of evidence linking Al-Qaeda to attempts to acquire expertise in chemical, biological and radiological weapons. While Al-Qaeda’s efforts were far from sophisticated, their determination to acquire such weapons was clear and their apparent willingness to use them terrifying. There is a chilling reminder in what Osama bin Laden told Time magazine in a 1998 interview – that the acquisition of weapons of any type, including chemical and nuclear weapons, was a “religious duty.” Should the terrorists ever succeed in using WMD in their attacks, it is not just the physical consequences that would be catastrophic. The psychological impact, in terms of the fear that would permeate across the globe, would be equally profound.

6. Unfortunately, the rise of global terrorism has coincided with a greater ease in acquiring WMD and related materials. With globalisation has come the dense network of linkages across the world to enable the speedy and free flow of goods, people and ideas. These linkages are necessary for economic growth. But they have also created more conduits and opportunities for proliferators to do their nasty business – ranging from the posting of blueprints for nuclear devices on the internet, to the anonymous transfer of illicit funds at the touch of a button, to the shipment of WMD related materials amidst the billions of tonnes of legitimate trade that circulate round the globe. Proliferation is truly a global enterprise. This much was clear from the uncovering of the vast and complex network of A Q Khan last year.

A Multinational Approach 7. Singapore is highly sensitive to the dangers of proliferation – perhaps more so than most countries – given our size and vulnerability. This is why counter-proliferation is one of our core security priorities. We have taken many counter-proliferation measures, including adopting an enhanced national export control regime. We have also supported the collective moves of the international community, particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which requires all states to enact laws and implement more stringent controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials. The unanimous adoption of this resolution was a clear sign that the world is alert to this urgent threat to international peace and security.

8. International treaty regimes like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as the various export control regimes, have been the cornerstone of international efforts to fight the spread of WMD. While these remain important instruments in the international community’s counter-proliferation tool-kit, we should recognise that they were crafted in an earlier age when the realities of proliferation were quite different. At the time of their creation, the overriding concern was to prevent the acquisition and use of WMD among states and the fundamental assumption was one of broad, if not universal, state compliance.

9. Today’s realities are far different, and new responses are required. We have to deal with an array of proliferators, from non-state actors to rogue states that flout international norms. To fight them, there is an urgent need for the international community to forge the cooperative action called for in UNSC Resolution 1540 and to create a responsive network of our own.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

10. PSI provides the international community with a useful means of plugging the gaps in the existing counter-proliferation system. When domestic systems of export controls fail, and when the treaty regimes are circumvented, PSI creates an effective mechanism for states to work together to interdict WMD-related cargoes that are already in transit by sea, air or land. But PSI goes beyond physical interdictions; it also involves targeted actions against the entire proliferation supply chain through coordinated efforts among enforcement, intelligence, and military agencies, port and civil aviation authorities, and even industry.

11. When PSI started, there was uncertainty about the legality of some of its aspects. These concerns are understandable, but we can take assurance from the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. This foundation document for the initiative gives the unequivocal assurance that all actions taken under PSI will be consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. Far from constraining PSI, national and international legal frameworks empower this initiative. For example, there is significant scope for the existing powers of national legal authorities to be invoked against proliferators who transfer illicit cargoes. Similarly, the draft Protocol to the International Maritime Organisation’s Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation (or the SUA Convention) will create a new category of offences relating to the transport of WMD and will empower states to take the necessary actions against such offences, including cooperating to do ship boardings in the high seas. Singapore has invited a number of Asian countries to observe Exercise Deep Sabre in the hope that this first-hand experience of a simulated PSI operation will allay their concerns and bring them into the PSI and thereby strengthen this effort.

12. The important role that PSI plays in the fight against WMD proliferation is widely recognised. In its report last December, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change acknowledged the pressing challenge of WMD proliferation to international security and highlighted that all states should be encouraged to join PSI. This March, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also lauded PSI’s efforts to fill a gap in the defences against the dangers of proliferation. To date, over 60 countries around the world have declared their support for this important international effort.

13. For a multinational initiative that is barely into its third year, PSI has made remarkable progress. PSI countries have agreed on a comprehensive set of principles which define a clear basis for their cooperation. These principles have been brought to life through the tireless efforts of a group of operational, legal and intelligence officials who meet on a regular basis to develop and refine procedures for interdictions. And these cooperative interdiction capabilities have been put to the test numerous times through a series of air, land and sea exercises around the world. Beyond exercises, PSI has also scored some important successes in disrupting proliferation networks – a notable one being the interdiction of an illegal cargo of centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment bound for Libya on board a German-flagged ship in October 2003.

14. The success of PSI can be attributed not only to the strong political commitment of governments and the unflagging efforts of the operational experts who have fleshed out its details, but also to the initiative’s unique design. It is “an activity, not an organisation”, and as such PSI sets out a fresh template for multilateral cooperation. It has no standing secretariat, pre-determined bureaucratic rules, or even a uniform set of detailed operational requirements. Instead, PSI adopts a pragmatic focus. It allows participants to contribute in accordance with their unique capabilities and their geographical location, while remaining united by a common commitment to counter proliferation. This pragmatic and action-oriented approach is particularly well suited to a complex global endeavour like counter-proliferation. It also potentially offers lessons on how we can deal effectively with other urgent transnational security threats.

Conclusion

15. Over the next few days, the participants of Exercise Deep Sabre will engage in an intensive series of activities. They include shore activities (with a table-top exercise and professional discussions on inter-operability), and harbour training in ship boarding procedures. The participating ships will then jointly put out to sea for a scenario-driven exercise which will involve surveillance and tracking of a vessel carrying a shipment of illegal dual-use chemicals in the busy SLOCs of the South China Sea. The vessel will be interdicted, escorted back to Singapore, and searched in port. This series of activities will be an important opportunity to enhance inter-operability, not just across the various participating countries but also across the different domains of the agencies represented in this exercise. Apart from strengthening the regional capacities, this exercise will also stand out as a mark of our countries’ collective commitment to fight the urgent threat of WMD proliferation.

16. It now leaves me to extend a warm welcome to all participants and observers and to wish all of you a fruitful exercise. Thank you. . . . . .