Singapore Government Press
Release, Media Relations Division, Ministry of Information, Communications and
the Arts, MITA Building, 140 Hill Street, 2nd Storey, Singapore 179369
Tel: 6837-9666
KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY PRIME
MINISTER LEE HSIEN LOONG AT THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC
STUDIES ASIA SECURITY CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE AT THE SHANGRI-LA HOTEL, ISLAND BALLROOM,
ON FRIDAY, 3 JUNE 2005 AT 8 PM
SECURING THE
FUTURE FOR A NEW ASIA
A Different World
1.
I welcome all delegates to the
fourth Shangri-La Dialogue. The world has changed significantly since the first
Dialogue in 2002. The terrorist attacks
of 9/11 had galvanised all countries in a global war against terrorism. Faced with a common threat, all felt instinctively
the solidarity of a shared humanity.
2.
The US led a coalition of nations to
mobilise a swift response. In Afghanistan, the coalition overthrew the Taleban regime,
and are helping an elected Afghan government to restore normal conditions. In Iraq, the swift and decisive military
campaign that ended Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror was followed by a
difficult period of reconstruction and insurgency. However, the situation changed fundamentally for
the better in January, when 8 million Iraqis defied death threats to vote in their first ever
free elections.
3.
The insurgents, Baathists and Al Qaeda-linked terrorists are
no longer fighting an occupying US force, but an elected Iraqi government. They are now targeting and killing Iraqi Shiites. But Shiite
leaders have been careful not to retaliate lest they trigger off an internecine
Shiite-Sunni war. Shiite leaders know that they have democratic power within
their grasp. They are willing to share power with the Sunnis by settling the
constitution and holding a second round of elections in which the Sunnis are
likely to participate. Hence although security remains a
problem in Iraq, it is clear to all, including Sunni Iraqis, that the
insurgents cannot win. Iraq is now on
the path towards a better and safer future, and the outlook for the Middle East
has improved.
4.
Between the Israelis and the
Palestinians, there is renewed hope of progress. The death of Yasser Arafat has
opened a window of opportunity which if not grasped by both sides, may pass. Syria is withdrawing its army from Lebanon,
which has witnessed an unprecedented show of ‘people power’, and just held
parliamentary elections. Saudi Arabia has begun to experiment with low-level
municipal elections. In Egypt, President
Mubarak has promised steps towards democracy. However, it is too early to tell whether
elections will lead to more open and progressive societies, or whether they
will strengthen radical and fundamentalist groups which will come into conflict
with the incumbent regimes and destabilise the region.
5.
Globally, another worrying
development is the fraying of the unity of countries that came together in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11. Together, the US and Europe form a vital core of
global political stability. But a deep rift
has emerged between the two sides of the North Atlantic alliance, arising from fundamental
differences over unilateralism and the pre-emptive use of force. 9/11 left Americans with a profound sense of vulnerability,
and a determination never to let it happen again. They have few inhibitions
about wielding their military might against security threats, actual or
potential. But many Europeans are uncomfortable with a world in which the US is
the sole hyperpower. For them, the defining moment of the contemporary era is
the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Among these Europeans, 11/9 resonates more
deeply than 9/11. 11/9 led to the
peaceful breakup of the Soviet empire, which has diminished the relevance of
NATO to Europe. So these Europeans find the security threats less pressing, and
prefer to deal with problems through diplomacy, foreign aid and multilateral
institutions. These differences in US and European world views represent a
major change in world politics.
6.
In Asia too, there have been major
security and strategic developments. We have made progress in fighting extremist
terrorism, but the threat remains. The emergence of China and India is changing
the strategic landscape, and requiring creative responses by all players to
achieve a new stable balance. And potential trouble spots continue to need
attention. These Asian security issues are the focus of my speech tonight.
Renewing a Common Resolve Against Terrorism
7.
The toppling of the Taleban in Afghanistan has destroyed
Al-Qaeda’s base and disrupted its command and control structure. Since 9/11,
nearly two-thirds of Al-Qaeda’s original core leadership have been killed or
captured. But, as one
analyst put it, “Al-Qaeda is more lethal as an ideology than as an organisation.”
This radical ideology continues to attract many
individuals and groups round the world. Its war cry is Jihad against the infidels
and a Caliphate uniting all Muslims worldwide.
8.
In Southeast Asia, governments
have disrupted the operational capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional
terrorist group affiliated to Al-Qaeda. A
number of key JI leaders have been captured, as have the perpetrators of the
Bali, Jakarta Marriot and Australian embassy bombings. But like Al-Qaeda itself, the JI is morphing into
a loose web of dispersed individuals and small groups, highly resistant to
penetration and detection. It is also tapping into other like-minded groups in
Indonesia to provide manpower and support for its terrorist activities. So,
while the JI may be weakened, it remains highly dangerous.
9.
Why has it been so difficult to
slay this multi-headed hydra? It is partly because some dangerous leaders
remain on the loose. But a more basic problem is that the underlying
infrastructure supporting terrorism remains intact. For example, the JI has used some madrasahs (religious schools) in
the region as platforms to talent spot, recruit, indoctrinate and train new
generations of fighters. Some of these madrasahs have been closed, but others continue
to operate. And in the Southern Philippines,
the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continues to host JI
training facilities in its camps, as it has done since the 1990s.
10.
Southern Thailand is another area of
concern. Violence among the Muslim
population there has been rising. This is still largely a separatist movement,
not linked to Al-Qaeda or JI activities. But recently Al-Qaeda materials were
seized in a madrasah in Pattani, and an International Crisis
Group (ICG) report noted that “as grievances mount and the conflict escalates,
however, there is a possibility that Thai groups could seek outside assistance
or that individuals from JI or like-minded organisations could come to help
unsolicited. If such elements enter the
fray, we could begin to see ... the transformation of a low-level,
ethno-nationalist insurgency into something more resembling a regional jihad.”
11.
One aspect of the terrorism issue is
maritime security. Every year, 50,000
ships carrying 30% of the world’s trade and 50% of the world’s oil pass through
the Malacca Straits. At its narrowest, between Raffles Lighthouse and Batu Berhanti
in the Singapore Straits, this vital corridor is only 1.2 km wide. With growing
Asian demand for energy, this traffic will only rise. Disruption of this vital artery
would have immediate economic and strategic repercussions far beyond Southeast
Asia. The threat is real and urgent. We know that terrorists have been studying
maritime targets across the region. The recent spate of violent pirate attacks
in the Malacca Straits shows up our vulnerabilities only too clearly, but a
terrorist attack would be a threat of an altogether different magnitude.
12.
Securing the Malacca Straits will
require shared political resolve and effective operations on the ground. The littoral
states have primary responsibility for ensuring maritime security, but they
need to harness the significant resources of the major user countries, without derogating
from their sovereign prerogatives. The users for their part have considerable interest
in contributing to this effort, as no country will want to be found wanting
should an incident happen.
13.
Beyond effective counter-terrorism operations, ultimately the
fate of extremist Islam will have to be decided by Muslims themselves, by reference
to their own values and interests. But
one reason why moderate Muslims are reluctant to condemn and disown the
extremists is the wide gap that separates the US from the Muslim world. The
sources of this Muslim anger are historical and complex, but they have been
accentuated in recent years by Muslim perceptions of American unilateralism and
hostility to the faith. In 2000,
three-quarters of the people in Indonesia, the world’s largest Islamic country,
said they were attracted to the US. By
2003, that had dropped to just 15 percent.
14.
However, if we were to take a poll
in Indonesia today, the percentage seeing the US positively would be considerably
higher. The US response to the Boxing
Day tsunami brought swift and effective relief to millions in Aceh. The generosity of the American government and
people, and the unprecedented humanitarian operations by the USS Abraham
Lincoln and the hospital ship USNS Mercy touched the hearts and minds of
Indonesians deeply, especially the survivors in Aceh.
15.
But this singular event has not eliminated
the antipathy that many Muslims still feel towards the US. Witness the recent deadly riots in several
Muslim countries after a spurious Newsweek report that American interrogators at
Guantanamo Bay had flushed a copy of the Holy Koran down the toilet. In this region, there were also
demonstrations in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.
The US needs to make more use of its “soft power” to win over international
opinion, correct misperceptions, and build trust and credibility, especially in
the Muslim world. In the long-term this is vital if the US is to prevail over
terrorism, and to maintain its position of global leadership.
Adjusting to a New Asia
The
Emergence of China and India
16.
Apart from developments in the war
on terror, tectonic shifts are taking place in the strategic landscape in Asia.
China and India are growing faster than nearly
any other major economy. Their sheer size and weight will lead to realignments
in the region and beyond.
17.
China’s emergence is the central reality
in Asia. It is already the major trading
partner of many Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and several
ASEAN countries. China is also a fast
growing source of tourists, and it is starting to generate investments and
employment abroad. All countries in Asia
want to grow these economic ties, and to strengthen their relations with China.
For its part, China realizes that it needs to help other nations to benefit
from China’s growth, and has been doing so actively and intelligently. China is aware of the potential disruptions
its growth may create, and has affirmed its determination to develop peacefully.
It is assuming responsibilities
commensurate with its growing weight, and stepping up to diplomatic and
security challenges such as those posed by North Korea.
18.
Concurrently, India is opening up
after half a century of insularity. Momentum
for reform is building and there is a growing sense that the changes taking
place are irreversible. India has revived
its “Look East” policy. Indian
companies, once content to stay within their protected home market, are now
venturing abroad. Indian interests in the region will grow, and so will Indian
influence.
19.
As India continues to open up its
economy, its strategic outlook and perspective on the world will also change. From being a land power mainly focussed on the
subcontinent, it is becoming a regional power with an outward orientation.
India is already stepping up economic, military and other exchanges with
regional countries. It has entered into Strategic
Partnerships with the US and EU. At the
same time, it is developing relations with China. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said
recently: “The world is large enough to accommodate the growth and ambitions of
both our countries. I don’t look upon our relations with the US as meant to
rival China. I look forward to enhanced cooperation with China.” India will define and
advance its own interests, and be neither a permanent ally nor a permanent foe
of the other major players.
20.
The emergence of China and India
brings tremendous opportunities to all, but also causes major changes to the
status quo. The challenge is to
integrate these two rising powers within the evolving regional architecture, while
maintaining the balance and stability of the region. The US, with its economic and
strategic predominance, is providing the overarching stability that enables
both China and India to grow dynamically. Between the US, China and India, they will
pull up growth rates in East, Southeast Asia and South Asia. America as the pre-eminent player in the
region has the rare opportunity to assist these two emerging giants and Japan,
no light-weight in industrial power, in settling the parameters for long term
cooperation and competition.
US-China-Japan
21.
Hitherto, the triangular
relationship between the US, Japan and China has provided the tripod of
stability for the region. In the new
Asian landscape, this triangle remains a critical part of the security
framework, but the balance of the three legs will have to shift.
22.
The US and Japan are steady allies.
From the US point of view, its Security Alliance with Japan anchors its
presence throughout East Asia and the Pacific.
For Japan, the alliance assures it of the security it needs, without its
having to accelerate the build up of its own military forces or worse, go
nuclear. Although the Soviet Union no
longer exists, the alliance still remains relevant to both parties. Military forces are present in the region on
a large scale. Japan’s National Defence
Programme Guidelines refer to North Korea as a major destabilising factor, and
China as having a major impact on regional security.
23.
China and Japan are the two
largest economies in Asia. Amicable
relations between them are critical to stability in the region. However, the two share a complex, intertwined
history. While economic relations are growing, the two
countries have not come to terms with the history of the Second World War. These problems cannot be solved overnight;
defusing them may take another generation or longer. Sino-Japanese relations are currently going
through a difficult patch, but I believe that neither country wants a
collision, and that leaders of both countries see the benefits of cooperation. One Japanese political leader has told us
that if the US fights with China, after 20 or 30 years they will restore
relations. But if Japan fights with
China, they will remain enemies for a hundred years. The two countries therefore need to find wise
ways to gradually defuse the issues and work towards reconciliation.
24.
US-China relations have become increasingly important in the
strategic triangle. The trade and economic ties between the two have grown
enormously, and provide a strong incentive for a cooperative relationship. These linkages go both ways. To take two
examples, at stake are not just Walmart’s huge purchases from China, but also China’s
substantial purchases from Boeing.
25.
Chinese leaders are pushing for economic growth, and recognise
that for this they need to work with the US. They also know that the US will be a more
powerful and advanced country than China for many decades to come. At the same time, mainstream US policy-makers are
convinced that the US needs to engage and cooperate with China, and manage the
frictions and domestic political pressures which will inevitably arise from
time to time, such as the current problems over China’s textiles exports and
its exchange rate. They recognize that a strategy of confronting China will
incur its enmity without seriously blocking its growth, while any attempt to contain
China will have few takers in the region.
US-Asia Ties
26.
However, the US response to Asia
cannot be confined to its relationship with Japan and China. Beyond this
triangular core, the US must engage Asian countries across a broad front. In particular, the US needs to actively engage
the ASEAN countries, both as a group and individually. Situated strategically
between India and China, ASEAN is well placed to benefit from the growth of
both giants. The ten ASEAN countries are strengthening cooperation among
themselves, in order to hold their own in the intense global competition.
27.
ASEAN countries are nurturing
their ties with China and India, but this has not diminished their keenness to grow
their links with the US. They know that the US presence contributes to the
security of the region, and that American MNCs can generate investments and
jobs which Chinese and Indian companies cannot yet do. This is true of
Indonesia, the largest ASEAN country, whose President has just had a successful
visit to Washington. It is also true of Singapore, almost the smallest ASEAN
country, which plays host to many US MNCs and offers transit facilities to US air
and naval forces. These and other linkages across the Pacific ensure that the
growing cooperation among the Asian countries does not lead to a closed
arrangement that splits the Pacific down the middle.
Managing Potential Trouble Spots
Cross-strait
Relations
28.
A stable Asia also depends on managing
potential trouble spots in the region. One
of these is the cross-strait situation.
29.
During last year’s Shangri-La
Dialogue, the danger that Taiwan might make a move towards independence and so provoke
a cross-strait conflict dragging in the US and Japan seemed very real. Today,
the tension has eased. China has passed the Anti-Secession Law. Japan has
formally stated that peace in the Taiwan Strait is one of its joint security
concerns with the US. The US and particularly President Bush has stated clearly
that it supports One China and does not support Taiwanese independence. Clear lines
have been drawn. Both the Taiwanese population and government now know that independence
is now out of the question, as any unilateral move towards independence will
not get US support. This has stabilised
the position.
30.
The visits of Lien Chan and James
Soong to the mainland have also changed the tenor of the domestic debate in
Taiwan. The contest is now over who can
gain economic advantages for Taiwan by cooperating with China, while guarding
Taiwan’s political interests. The
majority of the Taiwanese population favour the status quo and are eager to
participate in China’s growth. China has
offered sweeteners to Taiwan, such as zero tariffs on Taiwanese fruits exported
to the mainland, and a pair of giant pandas with shared naming rights. If both
sides demonstrate flexibility, the cross-strait situation will remain stable
and win-win possibilities can be realised.
India-Pakistan
Relations
31.
A second hotspot is Kashmir. India
and Pakistan almost came to blows over Kashmir three years ago. A war between
two nuclear states would have been devastating.
Fortunately, rationality prevailed and India and Pakistan are now both set
on pursuing economic growth for their peoples, and have shown a new willingness
to ease tensions. They have started to implement
confidence building measures, including the recent series of India-Pakistan
cricket matches and a bus service linking the two parts of Kashmir across the
Line of Control.
32.
Both India and Pakistan have said that
the peace process is irreversible. Others hope that this is so, but recognise
that a dispute that has gone on for almost 60 years cannot be solved
overnight. The two countries must now build
on the momentum and positive atmospherics to create more opportunities for
people-to-people interactions, and maintain a dialogue to tackle mutual
problems and concerns. Over time, this will gradually reduce tensions, and help
make possible some solution that is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the
people of Kashmir.
North Korea
33.
A third hotspot in Asia is the
Korean Peninsula. A nuclearised Korean Peninsula aggravates the problem of
nuclear proliferation and technology falling into the wrong hands. If North Korea goes nuclear, Japan and South
Korea could also reconsider their stands not to develop nuclear weapons. Asia, and
indeed the world, can ill afford this scenario.
34.
The Six Party Talks provide a
framework to manage the situation. But negotiations are being held hostage by
North Korean brinksmanship, which raises anxiety levels and the risk of
miscalculation. There are no easy
solutions. Pre-emptive military strikes
are too risky and may trigger a general war.
Economic sanctions are unlikely to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear
plans, and will only exacerbate the food crisis and cause more hardship and
suffering. Exposing North Korea to the
virtues of the free market will not stop its nuclear programme or the risks of
proliferation. Within the framework of the Six Party Talks, the other five countries
involved – China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US – must agree on the
objectives to be achieved. They must work out a coordinated strategy, and apply
both pressure and incentives to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear
programme and comply with international norms of good conduct.
Fostering Regional Cooperation
35.
The
Korean problem can only be solved by many countries cooperating with one
another. More and more regional issues are now transborder in character,
whether it is financial crises, counter-terrorism, SARS, Avian Flu or the
recent tsunami. This is
why Asian countries need to promote regional
cooperation among themselves.
36.
One way
is to foster greater dialogue through various fora, for example ASEAN, ARF and
APEC. This Shangri-La Dialogue itself brings together a
distinguished group of leaders and policy makers to address the security
challenges facing our region. Such
exchanges will promote mutual trust and understanding, thereby fostering
stability and a shared sense of community in the region.
37.
A
second way is to strengthen cooperation among regional defence and security
organisations. Whether we are dealing with terrorist attacks or the aftermath
of a natural disaster, the key players are the ones which possess the defence
forces, capabilities and expertise to do the job. Singapore is therefore
strengthening our links with friends and partners in the region, such as
through the proposed Strategic Framework Agreement with the US, the Five Power
Defence Arrangements, and our growing defence links with all the major powers.
38.
A third way is to build an open
and inclusive architecture of regional cooperation. ASEAN is launching a new
grouping called the East Asian Summit. The key question of participation has
been settled. In addition to the three dialogue partners in Northeast Asia,
ASEAN will also welcome India, and hopefully New Zealand and Australia. This broad
participation reflects the realities of the emerging pattern of cooperation in
Asia, and prevents Asia from turning in on itself.
Conclusion – Singapore’s Approach
39.
Singapore fully backs these
efforts to foster regional cooperation. Our approach reflects our perspective
as a small country, vulnerable to the vagaries of global forces beyond our
control. We work hard
to earn a living, keep our economy open, and link up with the ever changing
global network. We
assume that the world is
a dangerous place, and do our best to make it less dangerous for ourselves.
40.
We seek to be friends with all countries, while upholding our rights and
interests internationally. We will
pursue win-win co-operation with all countries willing to co-operate with
us. But this does not mean that we can
always accommodate the views and positions of other countries. From time to time, issues will arise. When our interests diverge or even when our
approaches to the same problem differ, we have to put our national interest
first and so must other countries. This
is the reality of the compelling pressures of relations between countries.
41.
We value our close relations with our ASEAN partners and will build on
them to strengthen co-operation amongst Asian countries. We believe that an open regional
architecture, which gives all the major powers a stake in Asia, is most likely
to produce a stable, predictable regional order in which countries big and
small can prosper together. We ourselves
are too small to shape the major events in Asia, but we will do our part to
foster peace and security in the region.
Hence we maintain capable defence forces to
safeguard our own security, and contribute to the security of the region. We support a strong and
effective United Nations with a reformed Security Council, as the best
guarantee of an international order that is not just based on might being
right.
42.
Although different countries have different and sometimes conflicting
interests, I believe that these principles command wide support, and provide
the basis for countries to work together.
Through our collective efforts, we can rise to the challenges of terrorism,
capitalise on the emergence of China and India, and manage the potential
trouble spots in the region, to secure a successful future for Asia.