Singapore
Government Press Release
Media
Relations Division, Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts,
MICA
Building, 140 Hill Street, 2nd Storey, Singapore 179369
Tel:
6837-9666
THE COMMITTEE OF SUPPLY
DEBATE, 4 MARCH 2005
In the 40 years since our Independence, Singapore has made steady
progress as a nation. We have been able to focus on our socio-economic
development. This has brought Singaporeans a comfortable standard of living and
given Singapore a certain standing in the world community. Our unity as a
society and as a nation has been enhanced. All this has been possible only
because we have had peace and security. That is the absolutely essential
foundation for our growth and progress as a nation.
The peace and security
we have enjoyed is not to be taken for granted. It is also not something we can
attribute to good fortune alone. Singapore has enjoyed peace and security over
these 40 years because we have dedicated, year after year, much effort and
resources to building the twin pillars of our defence, namely, deterrence and
diplomacy, as Mr Ravindran has noted.
Security Environment
Sir, as the remarks of some Members suggest, it is clear that our
security environment has become much more complex in recent years, and the
spectrum of potential threats has expanded. The uncertainties and potential
instabilities will continue to be a feature of the regional landscape. We will
always need to have a military capability which can defend Singapore’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our defence capability must also give us
the confidence to assert our rights as an independent sovereign nation. With
the political space to take decisions which best serve Singapore’s interests, we need not feel intimidated when the regional
climate turns sour, as happens from time to time as we all well know.
Beyond that, the SAF
must also be able to deal with low intensity conflict situations and terrorism.
The threat of terrorism continues to be real and immediate. It will not go away
any time soon, as terrorist groups are unwavering in their determination to
wreak havoc and destruction, and Singapore continues to remain a prime
target. Countering this threat requires
a multiplicity of effort – by governments acting alone and in cooperation with
one another, and as Mr Ravindran and Dr Ong Chit Chung had pointed out, by multiple national
agencies bringing together the many capabilities needed to deal with the
terrorists and their variety of weapons and in the various domains of land, sea
and air. Mr Leong
Horn Kee has asked about whether the SAF has
coordinated with the other agencies such as MHA. Indeed we have. And this is
the reason why the Prime Minister has appointed the Deputy Prime Minister Dr
Tony Tan as the Co-ordinating Minister for Security and Defence. His main focus
is actually to coordinate the various ministries, not just MINDEF and MHA, but
also the economic ministries, MOH and the other ministries in order to make
sure that Singapore is well-coordinated to deal with this threat of terrorism.
We will continue to
have to invest in enhancing our counter-terrorism capabilities and measures.
One example include building up a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Explosives, or CBRE defence group to consolidate all relevant operational
expertise in explosives, bomb disposal, and dealing with unconventional weapons
under one roof. So we go beyond just dealing with things which might have
already happened, but with things that might yet happen in the future. Our
laboratories in our defence research institutions also have the capability to
quickly test for and identify chemical and biological agents, as was
demonstrated by the role they played in our fight against SARS just two years ago.
Maritime Security
Dr Ong Chit Chung asked about maritime
security, and so did Mr Sin Boon Ann.
The complex nature of the new security
environment is really very well reflected in the area of maritime security,
particularly, maritime security in the Malacca Straits. This is a matter of
great concern for Singapore and the other littoral states – Malaysia and
Indonesia – as well as for the user states whose economic interests depend on
secure sea lanes in this vital waterway. Other interested parties, such as the
International Maritime Organisation and the shipping community, have also begun
to focus on how security in the Malacca Straits can be enhanced.
There has been significant progress in that there is now clear
agreement among regional countries and other stakeholders that maritime threats
are very real and that we all need to work together to deal with them. We’ve
made considerable progress since the discussion intensified approximately a
year ago. The Malacca and Singapore Straits has been one focus area.
Initiatives have been undertaken in a number of multilateral arrangements.
Singapore has just co-hosted a couple of days ago, together with the US, a
Confidence Building Measure (CMB) conference on Regional Cooperation in
Maritime Security under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) - CBM concept. This
brought together 170 maritime security experts from military, enforcement, port
and shipping, and policy agencies of 22 ARF member countries to discuss ways to
enhance maritime security. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (or FPDA) has
also recently expanded its focus to deal with non-conventional threats, with
particular emphasis on the maritime domain. The first maritime security
exercise was conducted last year as part of the annual major maritime exercise.
The 22 navies of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium have also initiated
substantive professional exchanges on maritime security issues and will conduct
a maritime security exercise this May. All these are very positive developments
which enhance confidence and build capacities. They also create a framework of
inter-operability that can be useful for any future contingencies.
At sea, we have the
Trilateral Coordinated Patrols conducted by the Indonesian, Malaysian and
Singapore navies in our respective territorial waters, as well as the
Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols, also in our respective territorial
waters. The Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols have largely wiped out
piracy incidents in the area of operations covered by these co-ordinated
patrols since they were launched more than a decade ago. The Trilateral
Coordinated Patrols have also shown some early successes. Although they have
not been able to completely stop piracy incidents, the number of piracy
incidents has fallen.
Piracy is a
centuries-old enterprise which will not be easily eradicated. Maritime
terrorism is a more recent scourge. Making the seas safe from both will require
the combined effort of many countries and Singapore is firmly committed to
this. We have been playing an active role in multilateral forums to enhance
maritime security, and we will continue to do so. At the same time, we will
continue to enhance the safety and security of our port and territorial waters
from terrorist threats, building on such efforts as the Container Security
Initiative and the recently-announced ASSeT ship
escort teams. Dealing with maritime security continues to be a work-in-progress
and we will continue our efforts.
Operational Readiness
Sir, I note the many comments and queries on the operational readiness
of the SAF. This has been raised by Mr Ravindran, Dr Ong Chit Chung, Dr Warren Lee, Mr Hawazi
Daipi and Mr Leong Horn Kee. I would like to assure Members that the operational
readiness of the SAF is a key priority. Singapore’s geo-strategic situation
makes us more vulnerable than most countries. Our small size means that we have
no manoeuvring space and no strategic depth to fall back on. We cannot afford
to sit back and absorb an attack. Besides having a good early warning system,
it is imperative that our defence force must maintain high operational
readiness.
The SAF structures its
forces in a concept of tiered readiness. There is a high readiness core which
is ready to react at very short notice to contingencies such as a terrorist
attack and humanitarian assistance. Operation Flying Eagle, our relief mission
after the Boxing Day disaster, was part of the high readiness core in action.
Beyond this core, the SAF can call up large numbers of NS units and personnel if
the situation warrants it. These NS units are well trained and operationally
ready. Some components can be mobilised for action in a matter of hours, while
others may take a couple of days.
The SAF has designed
the system to mobilise manpower, weapons, logistics supplies and civil
resources at short notice. Singaporeans are by now familiar with our regular
mobilisation exercises, which continually test and sharpen the system. It is
testimony to the commitment of our National Servicemen that the mobilisation
response rate is consistently high – 95% or higher. In all our mobilisation
exercises, the called-up units were ready for action and deployment within a
few hours of being activated.
We know that when the
time comes to fight the SAF may not have a second chance of a victory. That
drives the rigour and realism of the SAF’s training.
It is not unusual for National Servicemen responding to mobilisation calls to
find themselves almost immediately thrown into some kind of battle exercise.
Our National Servicemen know that they will be in the frontline should the SAF
ever have to go to war. We match our National Service units during exercises
against active units, and put them through the same strenuous and demanding
training. It says a lot for the spirit and commitment of our National
Servicemen that they often perform just as well as, and at times even better
than, active units in these exercises.
Operation Flying Eagle
The SAF is structured and trained such that any call to action will be
met with an immediate and effective response. The SAF’s
operational readiness was put to a real test most recently after the Boxing Day
earthquake and tsunamis hit our region. The SAF’s
reaction was a swift one, once we realised that we could make a useful
contribution to the disaster relief efforts. Members have asked for an
assessment of how we did. Well, I think we did very well. Almost immediately
plans were drawn up and preparations underway to conduct a disaster relief
mission and in a way which would be useful and effective.
The SAF could respond
so quickly and effectively because we had suitable capabilities and we were
operationally ready. Within 24 hours, the SAF had standby teams ready for
deployment. In less than 48 hours, we had sent a C-130 transport plane with
relief and medical supplies to Medan, and also a team
to consult with the Indonesian authorities on how the SAF could most usefully
focus its assistance. The next day, on December 29, an advance medical team and
two Chinook heavy lift helicopters were deployed to Medan.
On Day 4, we sent two Super Puma medium lift helicopters, and the rest of the
medical team. Another team of two Chinook and two Super Puma helicopters and
SAF personnel was deployed to a second theatre on Phuket
island. On Day 5, just 72 hours after they were
activated, the first of three helicopter landing ships, the RSS Endurance, left
for Sumatra, bringing with it 470 personnel in a specially assembled disaster
relief team of medical, engineering, naval and communications elements, and
supplies and heavy equipment.
Over a period of three
weeks after the tsunamis, the SAF deployed to Indonesia three helicopter
landing ships, which meant that 100% of our helicopter landing ships were
deployed because the fourth is currently still in the Gulf protecting the oil
terminal there just off Iraq. Six Chinook helicopters, two Super Pumas, two
field hospitals, two engineer teams with heavy equipment, two Air Traffic
Control Coordination Teams, a Mobile Air Traffic Control tower, and a one C-130
transport plane based in Singapore to ferrying supplies to Indonesia.
Altogether about 1,200 servicemen and servicewomen were deployed in what turned
out to be the largest mission that the SAF has ever undertaken.
The SAF had the right
equipment for this mission. But most importantly, we have the right men for the
mission - men and women with the professional competence, adaptability and
dedication. The rigorous training they had undertaken over the years kicked in
to produce a very fine execution of the mission. In a dynamic situation where
information was often inadequate, our people were able to adapt quickly and
frequently, so that they produced the results to make the mission a resounding
success. And among those people were some National Servicemen – NSFs and NSmen and volunteers –
who brought credit to the SAF with their professionalism and hard work.
While our servicemen
and women did us proud at the individual level, the sum proved to be even more
than the parts. The medic in our Banda Aceh field
hospital, or the Chinook pilot in the air over Medan,
or the naval diver on our helicopter landing ship off the coast of Meulaboh were physically far apart – hundreds of miles
apart and hundreds of miles from Singapore - but they operated as part of an integrated
tri-service force. The effective execution of this mission demonstrated how far
the SAF has come in its development as a joint force. It also demonstrated the
effectiveness of our system-wide response – by which I mean not just the
combined effort of the SAF men and women deployed in theatre, but also the
technology and support groups in MINDEF, our industry partners, and civil
resource partners. All these components were tied together by a rigorous
planning process and a tight decision-making loop. The mission also
demonstrated that the current training of our officers does equip them to work
with international agencies, NGOs, and the media. But we learnt some lessons as
well, and the SAF will take the lessons learnt in these areas to further improve
the training of our officers. This was a point that was raised by Dr Warren
Lee.
Operation Flying Eagle was a good test of our
response system. The results affirmed that the resources and effort we have put
into enhancing the SAF’s operational readiness and
enhancing our integration as a joint, tri-service force have been the right
investments.
Humanitarian and Peacekeeping
Missions
Mr Chay Wai Chuen, Mr Leong
Horn Kee, Mr Sin Boon Ann, Ms Irene Ng, have asked whether the SAF should now redesign itself
so that it can respond more quickly for humanitarian missions, and whether the
SAF should extend its capabilities to conduct non-military international
operations such as peacekeeping. In other words, to refocus
the SAF. Sir, let me state quite clearly that the primary mission of the
SAF must be to defend Singapore and enhance Singapore’s security. Our security
is the top priority, it is the reason why we have the SAF – it always has been,
and it will long be so given our particular strategic circumstances. And that
is the mission that the SAF must focus on. That means the SAF has to be
structured and developed primarily to meet the range of potential threats to
our security – from an assault on our sovereignty and territorial integrity, to
dealing with low intensity conflicts, to fighting terrorism.
While the SAF
safeguards our nation’s security, we are also conscious of our obligations as a
responsible member of the international community and as a good neighbour and
friend. Hence, we have made our contributions where an SAF capability or
capabilities could be useful in an Humanitarian
Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR) mission. These included disaster relief
operations following earthquakes in Indonesia and India, and other regional
countries.
The SAF has also
participated in UN and other international peacekeeping operations –
contributing about 1,500 SAF personnel to 14 missions over the years. Members
will recall that the SAF participated in the three successive multinational
missions in East Timor with combat peacekeepers, not just logistics and medical
support. We also had medical teams and headquarters staff, and an SAF officer,
BG Tan Huck Gim, was Force Commander of UNMISET. The
UN knows that Singapore is unable to contribute large numbers of troops but we
contribute in areas where we have niche capabilities and that we do well. The
UN’s appointment of an SAF officer to lead the peacekeeping force in East Timor
was testimony to the regard that the UN has for the SAF’s
professionalism. The Singapore Government will continue to contribute towards
such international operations and disaster relief efforts where we find that
the SAF’s capabilities could be useful and where it
is appropriate for the SAF to play a role.
Our recent experience
in Aceh highlighted two things - military assets and
military personnel are highly flexible and indeed can be used in humanitarian
missions. Our LSTs, transport planes, heavy lift
helicopters and heavy machinery were of high value when they were the only
things that could access the disaster zone speedily, quickly. Our search and
rescue teams, combat engineers, naval divers and pilots were of high value when
the tasks required their professional skills and when no one else could do
that. But they are also not always the best for such missions nor should they
be designed to do so. Once the emergency relief phase was over, international
organisations such as the United Nations and NGOs such as the Red Cross and our
own Mercy Relief had more relevant skills and experience. We should appreciate
and understand this and in fact, we should welcome this.
Defence Diplomacy
Sir, Mr Ravindran has raised a point about
defence diplomacy. It has long been a focus of MINDEF to build friendship and
generally develop a network of good relations with our ASEAN partners and
friends further afield – for this enhances our
security. The mutual understanding that grows out of increased interactions
reduces the risk of misconceptions and miscalculations and enables more
substantive and effective cooperation when that is called for. The friendship
that the SAF has cultivated with the TNI over the years greatly enhanced the
effectiveness of the SAF’s disaster relief mission in
Aceh. The cooperation and collaboration that follow
from defence diplomacy are other tangible payoffs that both sides can reap.
The SAF benefits
greatly from its exercises with friendly armed forces. The training tempo is
high. Last year, the SAF conducted about 70 exercises with over 20 armed
forces, an average of nearly 1.4 exercises per week with other countries. There
are both bilateral and multilateral exercises. All three SAF services, the
Army, Navy and Air Force, exercise with their foreign counterparts. The
overseas exercises allow the SAF to train in a wide variety of challenging and
realistic operating environments, as well as to benchmark itself against other
armed forces. And as some members asked, the SAF generally does do quite well.
Such exposure helps sharpen our professional skills and operational readiness.
For the SAF, the
training access that has been offered to us by so many of our friends has been
of great value given our land and airspace limitations. Today the SAF trains in
almost a dozen countries on a regular basis. Defence diplomacy has also helped
us secure defence technology collaboration with a number of countries with
advanced defence technology, including the US, France, Sweden and Israel.
MINDEF and the SAF
will continue to work on expanding our circle of friends, while strengthening
each valuable relationship that we have. In my recent travels I have found
considerable interest in engaging Singapore and the SAF. In Japan, for
instance, I had a substantive dialogue with Japanese leaders on several
security issues which reflected considerable common perspectives and a
potential for more interactions and deeper engagement. I was recently in
Bahrain and there was also an interest in increasing defence interactions with
Singapore. I shall be going to India shortly, in two week’s time. Singapore and
India had signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2003 to underscore the
commitment on both sides to strengthen defence cooperation, and I look forward
to discussing with my counterpart there how we can expand our cooperation.
Sir, MINDEF and the SAF will continue to place
a premium on maintaining a high state of operational readiness and expanding
our international ties through defence diplomacy. The evolving security
environment and changing nature of warfare demand that we develop other
capabilities that leverage on technology so that we remain prepared and will
continue to have high operational readiness in the years ahead. More than ever
before, we need to equip ourselves with military capabilities that can respond
to a complex and unpredictable security environment with flexibility and
innovation. To prepare for the future, MINDEF and the SAF are on a journey to
transform our military forces into the 3rd Generation SAF. Dr Ong Chit Chung, Dr Warren Lee and Mr Leong
Horn Kee have asked about these transformation
efforts.
This journey has many
dimensions. These include developing new operating concepts, re-shaping the
force structure, and developing our people. MINDEF has developed a blueprint
and action schedule for the development of the 3G SAF. These include the sorts
of capabilities that Dr Warren Lee asked about, for dealing with urban warfare
and terrorism and asymmetric warfare.
As we crystallise the
developmental framework for the 3G SAF, we are conducting parallel efforts to
experiment with new technologies and test prototype systems in field exercises.
For example, during a recent SAF exercise conducted in Australia, we deployed a
prototype lightweight Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (or UAV) which DSO National Laboratories
had developed. The UAV was able to provide live video of the opposing force to
our troops on the ground, so that troops at the lowest tactical level could see
clearly how the enemy was deployed and track their movement in real-time. With
this significant advantage, our forces’ decision cycles were shortened and
simulated weapons were delivered to the targets in a timely manner and with
great accuracy. In the same exercise, the SAF adapted commercial-off-the-shelf
wireless technology to allow the operational headquarters to be dispersed.
Headquarters are high-value assets and by dispersing the HQ over a large area
we could reduce its signature and vulnerability to enemy detection and attack
and also speed up the rate at which it can be redeployed.
We have deployed some
of the 3G SAF capabilities in actual operations. In Operation Flying Eagle, the
SAF deployed high bandwidth communications in the different locations in Aceh. These systems were adapted from the Defence Science
& Technology Agency (DSTA) and industry at short notice. The high bandwidth
satellite communications significantly enhanced the SAF’s
command and control capability. Operational discussions were conducted through
video conferencing in real-time and this enabled the SAF to respond quickly to
the operational requirements.
While the 3G SAF will be a more formidable and
operationally ready force that is enhanced by technology, it will always be the
soldier, sailor and airman who will ultimately make the difference. Fundamental
to the 3G SAF soldier are the values that are imbued in generations of the SAF
– loyalty, commitment, courage, professionalism. The 3G SAF soldier will also
be developed to be professionally and technically competent to operate and
exploit the full capabilities of the new weapons and systems. Dr Ong has asked whether our soldiers, especially our
full-time National Servicemen (NSFs), are capable of
doing this. We are fortunate that we have a technically literate population,
both of NSFs and operationally National Servicemen
and Operationally Ready National Servicemen (NSmen)
and they are highly motivated to learn new things. We have no difficulty with
that. Overall, the development of the 3G SAF soldier is a key component of the
transformation of the SAF.
Defence
Expenditure
Sir, the Government has been unwavering in
giving defence expenditure the highest priority. We have given our commitment
that MINDEF can spend up to 6% of our GDP each year on defence. We have been
spending between 4.5% and 5% over the past few years. This steadfast and
prudent approach has served us well. We are able to take a long term view of
our defence needs and force planning, and build a defence capability that gives
us the best value for the resources that we have invested. As a result, we have
a defence force capable of meeting its mission, which
is to deter aggression and to secure a swift and decisive victory should
deterrence and diplomacy fail.
Professor Ivan Png
had asked how MINDEF would change its expenditure should the budget be raised
or cut by 5%. MINDEF takes a very careful and considered approach in drawing up
the defence budget and we would not spend more just because money is available.
Similarly, we would not cut spending hastily so that the capabilities and
operational readiness of the SAF are compromised. MINDEF’s
budget is drawn up based on what is needed to enable the SAF to carry out its
core mission of defending our nation in the current situation and also in the
years to come.
The MINDEF budget is put through a rigorous
process of scrutiny every year. Priorities are established by the Joint Staff
in conjunction with the Services in a process where the different planning
agencies test their plans and ideas against each other. The budget plans and
priorities are again scrutinised by MINDEF staff before they are approved each
year.
Beyond assessing the question of what MINDEF
would do with the budget at the margin – 5% more or 5% less - at least once
every 5 years, MINDEF carries out a thorough review and reassessment of our
long term force structure needs. So, more than a 5% either way kind of
assessment, but a fundamental rethink of what we will need for our defence in
the future. The transformation to the 3G SAF is the outcome of the most recent
such review. To actualise the 3G SAF, MINDEF has created various structures and
processes to ensure that we are able to explore new ideas and concepts, and are
not trapped in conventional thinking that may no longer be relevant. For
example we now have a separate group, called the Future Systems Directorate, to
challenge the conventional wisdom, and to study and test new operational
concepts and systems that will give the 3G SAF a quantum improvement in
capability. The 3G SAF will involve a fundamental and far-reaching transformation
of the SAF in the coming decade. Building the 3G SAF is the major focus of our
defence expenditure in the coming years.
Meanwhile, we continue to ensure that we extract the best value for
money for our ongoing programmes. Dr Ong Chit Chung
asked about the progress of the Next Fighter Replacement Programme. Some Members of the House might
have read in the last day or so in the media about how some of the suppliers found Singapore’s tender one of the
hardest that they have had to work on. This shows how, as is MINDEF’s usual practice, we are very thorough with our
evaluation and how we make sure that the aircraft that is eventually selected
will give the RSAF an edge, and delivers the most combat power for money over
the aircraft's life cycle. There have been some media reports that we have
delayed the programme. This is incorrect. But our
robust and thorough evaluation means that we had not awarded the contract as
quickly as some might have hoped for. We are not in a hurry. We are coming to a final decision over the
next few months.
I would therefore like to assure Mr Chay Wai Chuen
and Professor Png that MINDEF places heavy emphasis
on cost effectiveness and maximising our defence capability from each defence
dollar, not just in the immediate time-frame but also in the long term.
Professor Png has
also asked for comparisons between Singapore’s defence expenditure and those of
a range of similarly sized countries. From a purely numerical point of view, an
analysis of the numbers along the lines that Prof Png
has requested is not difficult to do. All one needs is a calculator and a copy
of The Military Balance – an annual publication of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies. But such numerical comparisons on
their own are not particularly useful. The countries are a diverse lot.
Some have not faced any serious threat or conflict for decades, others live in
constant fear of invasion; some have mountains or large tracts of land to
buffer them, others have little or no strategic depth; some believe in being
self-sufficient and providing for their own defence, others have decided to
place their defence and hence the fate of their countries in the hands of
others. So, there are many different strategies and approaches that different
countries take to their defence needs and how they provide for them. There are
many other pertinent factors to consider, including geography, history,
demography. What is important for us to know is that we have decided that we
must provide for our own defence, for if we are not prepared to defend
ourselves we cannot expect anyone else to do so on our
behalf. This is a bitter lesson that our fathers and grandfathers learnt in the
past. Providing for our own defence allows us to chart our own course as an
independent sovereign nation, without having to buckle under pressure from
larger states, or to become subservient to their strategic imperatives.
Conclusion
Sir, the SAF’s work in Operation Flying Eagle
demonstrated its operational readiness and its ability to respond effectively
when the need arises. The sustained attention to operational readiness and
capability development for the long term, the ongoing build-up of our network
of defence relations – these must continue to be the focus of MINDEF and the
SAF. Beyond these current requirements, the long-term planning and force
structuring are just as important if we are to have a defence capability to
ensure Singapore’s security into the future and continue to give our people and
foreign investors confidence. We must always make sure
that our investments in defence, our investments in the SAF, give us the
capabilities to respond swiftly and decisively against any threat to
Singapore’s peace and security.
Thank
you, Sir.
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