Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the Bill be now read a second time.

This Bill proposes amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act to provide for overseas and electronic voting. It also specifies a vote recount margin and restricts the use of the registers of electors.

I will deal with each of them in turn.

Overseas Singaporeans are spread out in many countries. The number is not large, compared to the total Singapore population. Based on 1997 General Elections statistics, the Elections Department estimates that in a fully contested election, about 43,000 electors, or slightly more than 2% of the electorate, are likely to be resident abroad. Our sense is that the number of overseas Singaporeans of voting age is probably higher, as some of them may not have restored their names on the register over the years, and some came home to vote. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has estimated that the current number of Singaporeans overseas is about 100,000.

The Government recognizes that more and more Singaporeans will work and study overseas, with economic globalisation. Therefore, the Government has decided to try out overseas voting in a limited way at the next general elections if all procedures can be completed on time. This will allow us to gain some experience. We can then consider doing it on a larger scale.

For a start, overseas voting will be carried out at our Missions at Beijing, Canberra, Hong Kong, London and Washington. These Missions are chosen because of the significant number of Singaporeans living in China, Australia, Hong Kong, Europe and America, and the Missions have enough staff to conduct the elections.

Now, let me move on to the eligibility for overseas voting.

Under current election laws, only Singaporeans who are ordinarily resident in Singapore can vote. The term "ordinarily resident" is not explicitly defined. Strictly interpreted, a Singaporean who is not "ordinarily resident in Singapore" will not be allowed to register to vote. To enable them to vote overseas, it is necessary to expand the definition of "ordinarily resident".

Currently, there are various ways "residence" is defined in our statutes. For example, for income tax purposes, a natural person is resident in Singapore if he is in Singapore for 183 days or more during the year preceding the year assessment. Under the Women’s Charter, the courts would have jurisdiction over family disputes or to entertain proceedings for presumption of death only if one of the parties has been habitually resident in Singapore for a period of 3 years immediately preceding institution of the proceedings.

Clause 3 amends section 5 of the Parliamentary Elections Act to deem non-resident Singaporeans to be ordinarily resident in Singapore and qualified to be registered as electors if they have lived in Singapore for an aggregate of 2 years within 5 years of their registration to vote overseas. The 5-year period corresponds to the statutory maximum term of Parliament.

The 2 years in 5 criterion will not, however, apply to citizens and their family sent by the Government to work or study overseas, as well as those working in approved international agencies. Otherwise, some of those who are assigned by the government on long tours of duty or sent by the government to study overseas will inadvertently be disenfranchised.

It is not uncommon for countries to impose residential requirements as a condition to register their overseas voters. New Zealand and Canada require that their citizens be out of the country for no more than 3 and 5 years respectively to be eligible to vote overseas. For both countries, the residential requirements also do not apply to government officials and their dependents. There are other countries, for example, India and Israel, which allow only their diplomats or personnel on official assignment overseas to vote overseas.

This requirement of residence is an important one. It is a necessary pre-condition to constituency representation and to prevent plural voting, which is a form of electoral fraud. Our parliamentary elections are conducted on a constituency basis. The poll is conducted and votes are counted for each constituency. Therefore, a citizen’s residence in Singapore affords the basis for allotting him to a particular constituency to vote during an election. Secondly, without allocating a constituency based on a citizen’s residence, a citizen can easily vote more than once at any election and not be detected. This is plural voting. Thus, residence is and must be retained as a pre-condition to vote. The amendments effect a relaxation in a manner that will not allow plural voting to take place.

The new law deems certain groups of overseas citizens to be ordinarily resident in Singapore. These are citizens who are likely to have intentions to resume residence in Singapore. Hence the amendments provide them the facility of voting outside Singapore.

The voters’ constituency is based on the records on the Electoral Register, which in turn is derived from the register maintained by the Commissioner of National Registration. Those overseas Singaporeans who do not maintain a local address with the Commissioner of National Registration will not have their names entered or retained on the electoral register as they cannot be allocated to any particular electoral division using their foreign address. In order for an overseas citizen to retain a Singapore address on the register, the National Registration Act is also amended so that the citizen can either use the address of one of his local residential properties, or the local residential address of any family member or relative.

It is reasonable to expect a Singaporean overseas to register a residential address which he still owns or has some links with, and for this address to be used as the basis for determining the constituency he belongs to. If we allow him to register, say, his last known address, but he has already sold the property, then his elector status can be objected to by the current occupants at that address, when the register is opened for inspection. Therefore, the provision for the person to register the address of a relative in Singapore enables him to have an address in Singapore for voting purposes.

To prevent vote manipulation, we require the residential address to belong to his own property or his relative’s and not, say, his friend’s. Allowing an overseas Singaporean to register his friend’s address with the National Register will mean he can use any person's address as his local address, since it is difficult, if at all possible, to define "friends". This can then be exploited as a loophole to manipulate the votes. For example, a candidate can ask all his "friends" overseas to register an address in the constituency he is contesting as their Singapore address. In a very close contest, the overseas votes from these "friends" may just be able to change the outcome of the election.

Besides the qualifying criterion, Clause 4 amends section 6 to disqualify a non-resident from voting if he is in a foreign jail or has a Singapore warrant of arrest issued on him for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding 12 months.

Those in foreign jails are excluded for obvious reasons. Fugitives of justice should also be excluded because they are running away from Singapore law.

Electors who wish to vote overseas will have to pre-register at the Elections Department or one of our overseas missions. This will allow the Elections Department to determine and prepare the required resources. Clause 7 amends section 10 to provide for the establishment of overseas registration centres in any Singapore embassy, High Commission, diplomatic mission or consulate, while Clause 9 inserts a new section 13A that provides for the registration of overseas electors. The registration for overseas voting will open at our missions at the same time the register is open for inspection in Singapore. The registration for overseas voting will be open for 21 days, 7 more than the 14 days given for inspection of register in Singapore. This is because the overseas electors may need more time to be informed of the registration and to come forward to register at the missions.

Clause 14 inserts a new section 36A providing for the establishment of overseas polling stations in any Singapore embassy, High Commission, diplomatic mission or consulate, while clause 16 inserts a new section 39A that deals with voting by overseas electors. Overseas voting will be held as close to polling day in Singapore as possible. They can be held before the poll opens in Singapore but must close no later than the close of poll here. For example, for the voting at our London Mission, it will only be noon there when the poll closes at 8pm in Singapore. Hence, to provide the voters there with sufficient time to cast their votes, and yet have the poll close not later than the close in Singapore, we will likely have to hold the voting there one day earlier.

Clause 21 inserts a new section 49A which provides 10 days for the overseas votes to be returned to Singapore. Overseas votes will be counted as soon as practicable after they arrive in Singapore. However, if the winning margin based on the local votes counted is larger than the total overseas votes for a constituency, the winner will be declared on polling night. For example, if the difference in votes between the winning and losing candidates in a constituency is 1000, and there is only a total of 500 overseas electors for the constituency, the winning candidate will still be declared as the winner for the election since the 500 overseas votes do not affect the poll result in Singapore. However, overseas votes will still be counted, and added to the local votes and subsequently published in the Gazette.

Now, let me move on to electronic voting. Singapore currently uses a paper ballot voting system for the General and Presidential Elections. The system is manpower intensive, and the Elections Department anticipates increasing difficulty in getting public officers to serve as elections staff, especially given the trend of public service agencies being corporatised. We should also take advantage of technological advances. More people are now familiar with electronic devices, such as computers, ATMs, etc. Many also use ATMs to top up cash cards and subscribe to IPO shares and use Nets terminals to perform all kinds of transactions such as paying for goods at supermarkets.

The government has therefore decided it is time to make provisions for electronic voting in our elections. Election Department is currently developing the system. If ready before the next general elections, we will try it out on a limited scale. The trials will allow both the voters and election officials to learn from the experience before making its use universal.

Electronic voting is not new. Countries which have used electronic devices either for voting or counting of votes include the US, Belgium, Netherlands and Brazil. UK also tried out various forms of electronic voting and counting at its local elections in May last year.

Last October, I led a team to look at the electronic voting systems used in Belgium, Netherlands and US. Both Belgium and Netherlands use touch screen voting systems running on personal computers, Belgium since 1991 and Netherlands since 1998. Essentially, voters make their choices either by touching the screen with their finger or with an electronic pen. In Netherlands and US, I saw the use of dedicated voting machines, where the voters make their choices on a panel. I also saw the use of punch card and mark sense ballot papers for voting, where the ballots can then be counted electronically by machines.

After studying the different systems, we have selected the personal computer-based touch screen system for our use. It is fast and convenient to use. The computers and touch screen monitors can also be used for other purposes after the election, so that there is no problem with storage, maintenance and system obsolescence between elections. Obsolescence is a common problem which the election officials in the US, Belgium and the Netherlands highlighted to us during our October trip. This is not surprising, given the speed at which technology is changing. For example, we were told by one of our US hosts that they have difficulties maintaining the voting machines they have used for more than 10 years, as the company which supplied the machines has closed down. Such a problem will not occur if the voting system is only in the form of software, and the hardware can be used for other purposes after each election.

Clause 22 inserts new sections 50A to 50D relating to the use of electronic voting systems, which are referred to as direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems in the Bill. Before its use, the DRE voting system has to be scrutinized and approved by the Auditor-General or a person appointed by the Minister in consultation with the Auditor-General, before the issue of the writ. Approval is to be given after conducting such necessary tests in the presence of the Returning Officer and such representatives of any political party who wish to be present. The criteria for the approval process are also stipulated in the new section 50A. These include the need for the votes to be cast in secrecy and for sufficient audit trails to be available for verification purposes. The audit trails are necessary to prevent election fraud, and are no different from what we are already doing for the paper ballot system. The new section 50B also provides for the auditors to conduct pre-poll inspection of the DRE voting machines which will be used on polling day. This will be done in the view of the candidates or their polling agents who are present. After inspection, the machines will be sealed and stored at a secure place before being taken out on polling day. At the polling station, the presiding officer will have to ensure that the electronic voting equipment are still sealed and secured against use. The seals will be broken in the view of those in the polling station, before the machines are put to use.

In the event of a system failure, there will be technical staff on standby to attend to the machine. However, in the unlikely event of a total system failure, voting will be halted. It can resume at a later time using either ballot papers or the same DRE voting system. It can also be adjourned and conducted afresh another day within a week. For the trial at the coming elections, the conventional

paper ballot will be the backup. To prevent potential disruptions caused by power failure, polling stations using the electronic voting system will also have backup power generators. Under the new section 50A, the electronic voting system must be able to maintain all voting data stored regardless of power surges or outages.

From the voter’s perspective, I would like to emphasise that there is no change in the voting process with electronic voting. Only the medium will be different. For example, the making of a choice on the touchscreen is no different from the current marking of the ballot paper. The confirming of the choice on the screen is similar to depositing the marked ballot paper into the ballot box. To provide greater familiarity, it is stated in the new section 50D that the ballot image on the screen have to be the same format as the ballot paper. The section also provides the Minister with the power to make regulations to modify the current elections processes into electronic form. This is necessary as most of the current processes spelt out in the law are paper-based. For example, to allow the votes to be counted electronically, we will need to make the appropriate regulations to provide for it.

To safeguard against hacking, there will be no online link between the voting machines and the counting centre. The DRE voting machines will only be connected within each polling station via a local area network. For the purpose of the trial at the coming elections, the machines will come with a hardcopy receipt feature. The main purpose is to assure voters of the accuracy of electronic voting. If the pilot phase is successful, the 2 trial features, namely, the hardcopy receipts and paper ballot backup may be dispensed with in future elections.

Should the electronic voting system be ready for use at the next elections, there will be public education, not just for the pilot constituency, but the entire population as well. Singaporeans will have hands-on experience on demonstration touch screens at suitable community premises like community clubs, and neighbourhood shopping malls. There will also be mass publicity through broadcast and print media.

Let me next turn to the introduction of a recount margin. Currently, our election laws allow one mandatory recount, if requested by the candidate, regardless of vote margin at each counting place. The candidate or his election agent can also request for a recount at a counting place if he thinks the votes are too close there, without taking into account the aggregate of the votes for the whole constituency. This is an anomaly, as the closeness of the votes at the counting place level does not reflect the closeness of the contest for the whole constituency. For example, during the 1997 General Elections, the votes at quite a few of the 25 counting places in the Cheng San GRC were recounted as the margins were close. However, if we look the aggregated result, the winning margin was actually 9.6%. There should be no reason for a recount to be made for such a big margin.

To address this anomaly, Clause 21 inserts a new section 49B which will allow application only after the votes in the constituency have been counted. To avoid frivolous requests, recounts will be allowed only if the total winning margin is 2% or less of the total valid votes for a constituency. Using this criterion, Nee Soon Central in 1991 and Eunos GRC in 1988 would qualify for recount. The 2% margin will also apply to the recount of the hardcopy receipts for the constituencies using the DRE voting system.

It is not unusual to set a margin for the purpose of recount. Malaysian law provides for a mandatory recount on application if the difference between the 2 leading candidates is 2% or less of the total number of votes cast. In Canada, a recount ordered by a court on application is mandatory only if the margin is 0.1% of the votes cast for federal level elections. In the US, the recount margins vary from state to state. They range from 0.1% in Arizona to 5% in Vermont but the majority of them are 1% or less, for example, Virginia, South Carolina, Montana, Florida and Georgia. Therefore, you can see that the 2% proposed in the Bill is really quite generous.

In the US, some states also require the requesting party to pay a deposit for recount, which will be returned only if the results are reversed or if substantial errors are established. This is something we may consider implementing in future if there is a need.

 Restriction on Use of Registers

I shall now touch on the restrictions on the use of the registers of electors. Currently, the Parliamentary Elections Act is silent on how the registers may be used. Given the information contained in the registers, there is potential for their misuse for commercial purposes, or invasion of privacy. Therefore, to protect the interest of the electors and prevent abuse, we are amending the Act to restrict the use of the registers.

Clause 11 inserts a new section 21A which will allow political parties, candidates and their election agents to use the records in the registers of electors only for communicating with electors. Use of records for commercial purposes will not be allowed. If the candidate, the election agents or the parties are to disclose any such information to another person, they can do so only after obtaining the written acknowledgement of the person that he is bound by the restrictions under the Act.

Furthermore, any other person who obtains information from a register of electors cannot reproduce, store or transmit the information.

Breach of any of the conditions under this new section is an offence carrying a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment for a term of up to 6 months or both.

 Consequential Amendments

Finally, Clause 27 and the Schedule make similar amendments relating to overseas voting and electronic voting in the Presidential Elections Act. Amendments are also made to the Political Donations Act 2001 to make it clear that political parties are permissible donors and to effect other technical amendments to clarify provisions.

 Conclusion

Mr Speaker, Sir, the overseas and electronic voting proposals that I have presented today are significant steps taken by the Government to ensure that our electoral processes move with the times. The other amendments are practical changes to fine-tune the current electoral processes, and to safeguard voter privacy.

Sir, I beg to move.

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