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TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S BROADCAST ON

20TH SEPTEMBER, 1961 AT 7.30 P.M.

Let me tell you tonight the inside story about the PAP and the people who made up the leadership. In 1954 when it was formed we the non-Communists were in complete control of the party. The only persons who would press the Communist point of view were Fong Swee Suan, Chan Chiaw Tor and Devan Nair, 3 out of 12 members of the Central Executive Committee. After the election of the new Central Executive Committee in 1956, pro-Communist strength in the party had increased to 4 out of the 12 members. They were Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, Chia Ek Tian and Goh Boon Toh. At that time there was a sub-committee to redraft the constitution of the party. The Communists through James Puthuchearry were pressing very hard for a constitution which would allow the branches complete control in the party and allowing branch committees to nominate members to the Central Executive Committee. Such a

constitution would in effect mean that the communists would be able to capture the party. For penetration of the branches of the party is a relatively easy matter because branches are open to everybody to join and participate in without serious checks. And from time to time these branches do come under Communist control and manipulation. Unfortunately for them while they were pressing to capture the party, they were also planning to capture the trade unions.

In 1956, they were all detained in a purge which was accompanied by riots and arson. That was the end of their attempt to change the party constitution and capture the P.A.P.

But again in 1957, the pro-Communists tried to capture the party. To do this they made use of membership admission cards to the annual Party Conference, which had been posted to members who had given trade union premises as their addresses. They used these cards and brought in non-members and finally succeeded in voting in 6 out of the 12 members of the Central Executive.

You will remember in August 1957 there was a minor crisis in the P.A.P. when my colleagues, Toh Chin Chye and myself and four others refused to take office in the P.A.P., for to have done so would have been to lend cover to the six

who were pro-Communists. For we would not have been able to get a decisive vote to carry through our non-Communist policies. For a short while, Tan Chong Kin became the Chairman of the party and T.T Rajah the Secretary-General. Again unfortunately for them, they were planning also to capture the T.U.C. They got involved in a purge in which 5 out of the 6 pro-Communist members in the Central Executive were arrested. Three out of the 5 were banished to China.

After this experience we amended our party Constitution to make sure that the party cannot be so easily captured. We instituted two classes of members - ordinary members and cadre members. Ordinary membership is open to all and secret penetration by Communists into this group is easy if they send in their people who are not yet well known. But only those who have proved over a period of time proved that are sincerely and honestly with the party can become cadre members. An election of the Central Executive Committee is only by cadre members. In this way we have thwarted their latest attempt two months ago to try and capture the party. This is what they really mean when they talk of lack of intra-party democracy. This method of preventing Communist penetration and capture is most important.

In 1957 when the pro-Communists set out to capture the party using ordinary members' admission cards, they were able to succeed and they ousted

Ong Eng Guan, the then party Treasurer, from the Central Executive Committee. So when Mr. Ong formed his new United People's Party he has very wisely adopted the P.A.P. cadre system of organisational control to prevent capture.

When they were detained after the troubles in September 1956, I used to visit the leaders who were kept separate from the others in what they called a "camp" outside the prison. These 6 leaders were Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, James Puthucheary, S. Woodhull, Chan Chiaw Tor and Devan Nair. They were detained for 2 ½ years. Lim was the most important open-front leader the M.C.P. had built up. By 1955 he knew that I knew this. He is a friendly and quiet person. He is prepared to devote his whole life to working for the creation of a Communist Malaya. But once you resist and fight the Communist cause, then you can expect all that personal friendship to mean nothing in the ruthless and relentless struggle for supremacy.

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Lim Chin Siong was once Devan Nair's closest open-front comrade.

Devan Nair was his constant guide. But when Devan Nair decided that the M.C.P. was wrong in continuing the armed struggle after independence in the Federation and not coming to terms with Malayan nationalism, Lim began to fight Devan Nair relentlessly and ruthlessly, by fair or unfair methods, by smears and intimidation, to destroy every influence that Devan Nair had with the

workers and in the unions. His personal friendship for Devan Nair meant nothing.

I knew that this was what one must expect of a good Communist.

Towards the end of 1958 I began to discuss with Lim, Devan and the other six in Changi camp the question of whether the P.A.P. should fight to win the next General Elections. Lim knew that I had grave reservations as to the wisdom of this. One of these reservations was what he and the Communist forces he led would do after we had won the elections. He was anxious that we should fight to win. He offered to go away to Indonesia to study and not be in Singapore, if that would lessen P.A.P. fears. I told him that it was not so much he that we were concerned with but more the Communist forces which would appoint another open-front leader if he were not there to lead them. I told him that even if he sincerely joined our democratic side we would still have to face the forces of

M.C.P.

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However, in the meantime events developed with considerable rapidity outside the camp in Singapore. Great acrimony and hostility was developing between the P.A.P. and the S.P.A. Government. There was considerable bitterness in the wrangles in the City Council between the P.A.P. and the S.P.A. And the exposure of the Chew Swee Kee 700,000 dollars so-called "gift", made

worse by the disclosures in the Commission of Inquiry and brought things to fever pitch. We decided that we had to fight to win because to lose would mean that a bunch of rogues would form the Government and ruin the country and also fix the P.A.P. So in the end we had no choice but to win.

In June 1959 we won the elections. We got them released from prison, Lim Chin Siong and seven others who were closely connected with the P.A.P. leadership. When they were released they published a signed statement in which they endorsed whole-heartedly and without reservation the non-Communist aims and objectives of the P.A.P. For all of them except Lim Chin Siong, it was at that time a genuine change of heart. Devan Nair, Fong, Woodhull, James Puthuchery and Chan Chiaw Tor they all told me that we must not go back to the mistakes of 1955-1956 and allow the M.C.P. to make use of the P.A.P. and mess up our policy. And they solemnly declared to me that if the M.C.P. fought the P.A.P. because of this they would fight with the P.A.P. against the M.C.P. After having seen the folly and the failure of the Communist policies, they all (except Lim) honestly and sincerely believed that the P.A.P.'s road to a non-Communist, socialist and independent Malaya was the one best suited to the conditions of Malaya. We accepted this declaration as sincere and appointed them political secretaries. Lim Chin Siong also signed this statement. Let me quote a passage out of the statement he signed:

" We must face the facts. So long as the fight was against British colonialism the differences between the peoples of Malaya were muted and dulled in the desire to achieve the common goal of freedom by common effort. Now that this freedom has been won in the Federation all the differences come back into their own. They can and must be resolved. And we in Singapore can set the way to the solution of these important differences in language and culture. That is what we can and must do in the next phase of our struggle for freedom, the struggle for merger".

"It was not the might of British arms which defeated the armed revolt led by the M.C.P. but the failure of the M.C.P. to establish itself as a nationally based movement. And thereby hangs a lesson which Malayan Socialists will ignore at their own peril."

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I had my doubts as to Lim's sincerity. But then a man is entitled to be believed until his actions prove his words to be false. We hope he genuinely and sincerely believed with us that the right road for us was merger and the creation of a democratic, non-Communist and socialist Malaya. But at the same time, just in case they were not honest and sincere, we took care to see that there were

safeguards and guarantees to ensure that they could not do the country great harm. They were given no access to secret matters. And Lim Chin Siong was especially put in the Ministry of Finance where he could do no harm. They were not, like Fong Swee Suan for example given their citizenship papers. None of them were made P.A.P. cadre members. After the first year we became more and more convinced that Lim Chin Siong was only playing a game and was only interested in building up Communist strength in the unions and slowly undermining the influence and prestige of the Government with the workers. He was not sincere to his signed declaration. And over the last two years he was able to persuade many like Fong and Woodhull to go back to the Communist side.

Once we found that Lim and his friends were only playing a game for the Communist cause it was a matter of time before the parting of the ways took place. So long as he did nothing openly to block the programme and policies of the P.A.P. to which he had subscribed, we had no reason to break with him.

Once he decided to disavow the P.A.P.'s most fundamental objective of independence though merger with the Federation, the time come for the Communists and their supporters to part with the nationalists and the socialists in the P.A.P.

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